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[1345] 
A Tale of Three Families: 
Historical Households, Earned Belonging, and 
Natural Connections 
Allison Anna Tait* 
 
Cases targeting family regulation in the 1970s turned, for the first time, on three 
contrasting and sometimes competing theories of the family: historical households, 
earned belonging, and natural connections. This Article introduces and defines these 
three theories and offers a descriptive account of how the theories were used by litigants 
and the Supreme Court alike to measure discrimination, evaluate the rights of 
individual family members, and, often, increase household equality. The theory of 
historical households, developed with great success by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, invoked 
a Blackstonian family defined by gender hierarchy and the law of coverture, and 
posited that this model was in need of legal reordering. Earned belonging, offered by 
Ginsburg as a replacement for historical households, presented a new and more 
democratic family theory centered on ideas of conduct-based outcomes. The earned 
belonging theory proposed that an individual could earn her full place in the family 
through positive conduct and performance. The theory of natural connections, on the 
contrary, promoted received wisdom about family ordering based on biologic “truths” 
about sex-based differences. Courts operating according to natural connections theory 
privileged maternal rights, rejected many paternal claims, and affirmed laws promoting 
the nuclear, or natural, family. The work of this Article is to present a new and 
synthetic reading of cases about wives, illegitimate children, and unwed fathers that 
follows these three logics, revealing how they weave together and why earned belonging 
provides the strongest support for Ginsburg’s original vision of an equalized 
household. 
 
 * Gender Equity and Policy Postdoctoral Associate, Yale Women Faculty Forum; J.D., Yale 
Law School, 2011. I owe particular thanks to Joan Williams for inviting me to contribute to this issue 
and for her many helpful comments. Many thanks also to Ann Alstott and John Langbein for early 
comments that were useful in shaping the Article; to Judith Resnik for her thoughts, suggestions, and 
continual support; to Brian Soucek for his feedback; and to Luke Norris for never tiring of talking 
about the Article or reading revisions. Thanks also to the editors for their wonderful work bringing 
this Article to publication. 
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Introduction: The Three Logics of the Family 
Every family has a story.1 And whether happy or unhappy, small or 
large, every family faces similar questions about household governance, 
the permeability of family boundaries, and the allocation of resources. 
 
 1. With this statement, I invoke Tolstoy, who famously began Anna Karenina with the sentence, 
“All happy families resemble one another, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Leo 
Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 1 (Louise Maude & Aylmer Maude trans., Oxford Press 1995) (1877). 
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Courts, when asked to intervene, have reasoned through cases about 
rights based in the family using various arguments and doctrines about 
marriage and the best interests of the child to determine benefit 
allocation, custody, and marital rights. This Article proposes the idea 
that cases targeting family regulation in the 1970s turned, for the first 
time, on three contrasting—and sometimes competing—theories of the 
family in order to determine questions of discrimination, gender 
typecasting, and the scope of family inclusion. The three blueprints for 
the family—invoked by advocates and the Supreme Court alike—were 
theories about historical households, earned belonging, and natural 
connections. This Article introduces and explicates these three theories 
for family ordering and subsequently explores the contexts in which they 
appeared—cases about economic entitlements for husbands and wives, 
cases about the economic rights of illegitimate children, and cases 
involving the parenting rights of unwed fathers—offering a new and 
synthetic reading of these cases based on the theories of the family that 
are intricately woven through them. 
The three forms of logic, which defined the parameters as well as 
the stakes of family inclusion, first appeared together and coalesced as 
parts of a dialogue about family in the 1970s. Between 1968 and 1972, 
three cases—Levy v. Louisiana,2 Reed v. Reed,3 and Stanley v. Illinois4—
all came before the Supreme Court and set the stage for deliberation 
over rights within the family and family belonging. Leveraging equal 
protection and due process claims, Reed, Levy, and Stanley formed a 
triumvirate that heralded a new period of debate about the family and 
marked a new phase of advocacy efforts to end the multiple forms of 
separate spheres that restricted family equality. The trio of cases also 
marked a new phase of judicial understanding about the family, brought 
about by the Court’s confrontation of a range of claims made by wives, 
illegitimate children, and unwed fathers. The Court connected these 
seemingly dissimilar claims in synthetic ways, referencing each in 
discussion of the other and generating a rich analysis about the family as 
a working unit. During this time—the decade ushered in by Reed, Levy, 
and Stanley and defined by the cases that followed—the three theories of 
historical households, earned belonging, and natural connections were 
very much at the forefront of conversation. These three logics, deployed 
by advocates and the Court, shaped the contours of conversation, 
determined the outcome of cases, and set in place the architecture of 
family definition. 
 
 2. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 3. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 4. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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A. Historical Households 
The theory of the historical household posited an outdated, 
Blackstonian image of family,5 regulated by the master-servant 
relationship as embedded in domestic relations law,6 and proposed that 
this household was antiquated, out of step with the modern social 
landscape and in need of legal reordering. Arguing from history enabled 
the conclusion that the discriminatory legal architecture of the family was 
the product of a past bias, stemming from historical contingency and not 
essential reason. This argument from history was substantively 
developed and favored by Ruth Bader Ginsburg as an advocate and 
litigator. At the helm of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Ginsburg 
continually pushed the Court to reject the historical form of the 
household and acknowledge the shifting cultural landscape of marriage 
and family.7 Social change driven by economic need and cultural trends—
women entering the workforce and the decline of the traditional family—
gave substance to these claims for reordering.8 As Ginsburg wrote, 
“Changes pervasively affecting society set the stage. By the late 1960’s, a 
revived feminist movement spotlighted those changes.”9 By the 1970s, 
Ginsburg—using the historical household theory—suggested it was time 
to modify and reform the ossified legal system that regulated family 
interactions and household rights.10 
Accordingly, Ginsburg struck out against this system with her vision 
of equal citizenship and an equalized household. Ginsburg’s goal, aligned 
with a broad feminist push to reshape the family, was to “open up that 
institution to critical scrutiny and question the justice of a legal regime 
that . . . permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some family 
 
 5. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England 430 (Robert Bell ed., 
Layston Press 1967) (1765). For a treatise on the law of husband and wife in the American context, see 
James Clancy, A Treatise of the Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Husband and Wife 1 (photo. 
reprint 2010) (1828). 
 6. For a discussion of the original master-servant orientation of family law as well as its 
transformation, see Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part I, 23 Yale J.L. & 
Human. 1, 2 (2011). 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 
1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 161, 167–68. 
 9. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 451, 457 (1978). 
 10. Family law was not the only legal domain in which ossified statutes riddled the books. For 
example, the 1970s saw the demise of mortmain statues in a number of states through either legislative 
repeal or a ruling of unconstitutionality. See Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the 
United States, 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 407, 458 (1992). Guido Calabresi describes the phenomenon as 
“Choking on Statutes” and discusses the judicial role in addressing legal obsolescence, as he calls the 
problem of outdated statutes. See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1 
(1982). Calabresi writes about the use of constitutional law, and the equal protection doctrine in 
particular, to remedy these obsolescences. In this context, Calabresi mentions sex discrimination cases, 
in particular Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb, and mentions the Court’s debate over whether or not the 
statutes in question were “archaic.” Id. at 9–10. 
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members to others.”11 In litigating cases, Ginsburg both uncovered 
discriminatory historical practices and gave the Court the tool of 
historical analysis with which to understand social change. “Ginsburg’s 
antistereotyping approach was not simply hostile to sex classification or 
sex differentiation; she opposed traditional sex stereotypes insofar as they 
were part of a system of social roles and understandings that anchored 
women’s inequality.”12 The goal was to “liberate individuals and families 
from the paternalism of the previous era,”13 and Ginsburg developed 
“new claims voiced in terms of individual rights, autonomy, and 
equality.”14 The civil rights movement provided a model for new equality 
claims, and the women’s rights movement introduced that model into the 
household, transforming the home into a locus of substantive 
transformation and exemplary social reordering. 
History, Ginsburg taught her colleagues and members of the Court, 
was a way of marking change, a method for identifying disjunctive 
moments when law did not match social realities, and a tool for revealing 
the constructed quality of gendered assumptions. And while history 
certainly had other uses and senses, this was the dominant set of 
meanings mobilized by Ginsburg in her argumentation before the 
Supreme Court. Ginsburg, reviewing the work of the Court in the 1970s, 
wrote, “[T]he Supreme Court . . . has been tugged in a new direction by 
arguments urging accommodation of constitutional doctrine to a changed 
social climate.”15 It was Ginsburg herself who tugged the Court in the 
direction of overturning history, suggesting that household regulation 
should mirror contemporary and actual practice rather than historical 
assumption and inherited conventions.16 
B. Earned Belonging 
The second vector of analysis, promoted by both advocates and the 
Court as a measure of the rights of individual family members, was the 
idea of earned treatment and belonging. The earnings argument was a 
new argument putting forth the idea that even though individuals 
acquired family relationships through birth and marriage, they truly 
earned legal rights of family belonging and resource sharing though 
 
 11. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 Fam. L.Q. 475, 475 (1999). 
 12. Reva Siegel & Neil Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J., 771, 789–90 (2010). 
 13. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family Law, 
1890–1990, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 273, 289 (1995). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 171. Ginsburg also noted that the path to progress was rocky 
because “original understanding” presented a counterweight to doctrinal change. Id. “It is more 
difficult to elaborate bold doctrine regarding sex discrimination when even a starting point is 
impossible to anchor to the constitutional fathers’ design.” Id. at 172. 
 16. See infra Part I. 
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personal investment and conduct.17 At its core, the earnings theory was 
one of earned treatment, just reward, and conduct-based regulation. The 
earnings theory was especially useful at this point in time because it 
provided an alternative to the historical household argument. Often both 
advocates and the Court proffered it to fill the void left when historical 
household regulation was found to be unconstitutional and impermissibly 
discriminatory. Earnings theory was a replacement for historical 
households, a new and more democratic family theory that centered on 
ideas of economic justice and reward for hard work. 
Ginsburg promoted the earnings logic in the Reed brief, stating the 
case for “women seeking to be judged on their individual merits.”18 
Invoking the race analogy in the context of equal protection, Ginsburg 
explained the replacement of history with earnings: “Through a process 
of social evolution, racial distinctions have become unacceptable. The 
old social consensus that race was a clear indication of inferiority has 
yielded to the notion that race is unrelated to ability or performance.”19 
The status of women, Ginsburg argued, was undergoing the same 
transformation—from social consensus that gender confined a woman to 
the home and an inferior position both within and outside of the 
household to more modern notions of performance-based assessment—
and therefore deserved legal protection. Women deserved, according to 
this logic of earnings, to have their work valued equally with the work of 
men; likewise, wives and husbands were entitled to equal statutory 
benefits because each spouse had invested labor and worked hard to 
provide comfort and security for the other. 
It was no different with the status of illegitimate children. 
Reiterating the holding of the Supreme Court that “[d]istinctions 
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature 
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality,”20 advocates for illegitimate children proposed that it was 
time to replace history with earnings. The Court agreed and spelled out 
the argument very clearly in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 
with Justice Powell writing that “imposing disabilities on the illegitimate 
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing.”21 Illegitimate children were entitled to family benefits 
because they were participating—and blameless—members of an 
informal family unit. These “hapless children” who suffered from unjust 
 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. Brief for Appellant at 10, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4). 
 19. Id. at 16. 
 20. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
 21. 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
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“social opprobrium”22 had done nothing to earn their marginal social 
status or being barred from recovering the same economic benefits 
legitimate children received. Wives and illegitimate children had, in this 
view, earned the right to be judged according to merit just as they had 
not earned the penalties accorded to them because of stereotyping and 
bias. The earnings theory provided a new standard for family 
participation and inclusion, and introduced the idea that an individual 
could earn her full place in the family (and her right to family resources) 
through positive conduct and performance. 
C. Natural Connections 
The natural connections argument represented a logic on the 
opposite end of the spectrum from the historical household logic, 
promoting received wisdom about gender roles and family ordering 
based on biologic “truths” about sex-based differences. The theory of 
natural connections embraced motherhood, rejected many forms of 
paternal involvement in child rearing, and vigorously protected the 
model of the nuclear, or natural, family. “The nuclear family,” in 
determinations made using the natural connections theory, was 
“sanctified as neutral, essential, and inevitable.”23 According to this 
theory, the nuclear family represented nature expressed in family design. 
This “traditional legal family”24—which was, of course, a historical 
construct in its own right25—“counted as sacred because it expresse[d] 
and reformulate[d] images of ‘appropriateness’ or ‘naturalness’ found in 
the larger society.”26 These notions of naturalness in the family correlated 
with sociocultural values of “monogamy, procreation, industriousness, 
[and] insularity.”27 The nuclear or natural family was based primarily on 
an established sexual tie between a man and woman, and the Court paid 
serious attention in the adoption cases to the relationship between the 
mother and father, making plain “[c]onstitutional doctrine’s clear 
 
 22. Id. at 176. 
 23. Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law 
and Society, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 387, 390. Martha Fineman writes that the  
veneration of the nuclear family is coercive, with the state through its regulatory 
mechanisms (whether they be the criminal justice system, child welfare laws, or tax codes 
and other regulatory civil laws) defining and securing for the nuclear family a privileged if 
not exclusive position in regard to the sanctified ordering of intimacy. 
Id. at 388–89. 
 24. Id. at 390.  
 25. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 1, 2. Fineman states that the nuclear family was “[d]efined initially through religious precepts 
in ecclesiastical courts in England” and historically constructed from there. Id. 
 26. Fineman, supra note 23, at 390.  
 27. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 Yale L.J. 1236, 1256–57 
(2010). 
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preference for the marital nuclear family above other alternatives.”28 The 
parental relationship also constituted a major part of the nuclear family, 
and the other natural relationship that held great purchase in judicial 
reasoning was the mother-child relationship. Opinions in the adoption 
cases cited to anthropological literature positing a unique relationship 
between a mother and her child—a relationship not available to the 
father—and repeated supposed common knowledge that unwed fathers 
were uninterested parents.29 
Reasoning about natural family connections and the natural family 
unit provided a form of judicial analysis to counter the historical 
household theory. Primarily, the natural family theory came up in the 
context of unwed fathers and their rights to block adoptions or gain 
custody rights.30 Analyzing cases about the rights of unwed fathers, the 
Court focused not on the arc of history but rather on the state of nature. 
If history had any place in this analysis, a quick scan of custom reinforced 
for the Court the idea that an unwed father’s historical positioning 
neither encouraged nor tolerated the unwed father to become a parent. 
History, in the context of the unwed father, did not lay bare aged 
constructs of discrimination but rather confirmed the naturalness of 
conventional assumptions. 
The natural connections argument also highlighted the limits of the 
earnings argument, overcoming evidence of earned belonging with 
truisms about the natural—and different—characteristics of men and 
women as parents. The earnings criteria often worked against unwed 
fathers and confirmed their role as nonparticipants in the family. Some 
adoption cases suggested that unwed fathers had not earned a right to 
contest the adoption of their children because they had not contributed 
sufficient income or other resources to the family unit. These same cases 
also suggested that the unwed father had failed to earn the right to 
parenthood because he had failed to belong to the nuclear family in a 
cognizable way—engaging in a marriage-like relationship with the 
mother and being a parent of the daily household.31 
The work of this Article, then, is to follow these three logics through 
the cases about wives, illegitimate children, and unwed fathers, uncovering 
when and how they thread together. Part I of the Article is an analysis of 
the historical household theory at work in many of the cases that Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg helped to litigate while at the helm of the ACLU’s 
 
 28. Id. at 1252. Alice Ristroph and Melissa Murray posit the importance and primacy of the 
“marriage model” in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id. (“As a general matter, marriage historically 
has been a conduit to family formation, as law channeled individuals (and their sexual behavior) into 
marriage, and from marriage into coupled parenthood.”).  
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Part III.B. 
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Women’s Rights Project. In the brief for Reed, Ginsburg set out the 
historical argument for modern gender equality, and subsequent cases 
continued to showcase the historical discrimination that women suffered, 
particularly the economic disability inflicted on women by outdated 
coverture laws. Part II offers a reading of the illegitimacy cases, starting 
with Levy, and explores the full articulation of the earned belonging 
theory. This Part analyzes how these cases cemented the rights of 
illegitimate children by affirming the unearned nature of their unequal 
treatment. Part III of the Article addresses the unwed father cases and 
the alternate analytic framework of natural connections that the Court 
used in considering the question of adoption rights. This Part illustrates 
how the natural connections theory countered the historical household 
and limited the effectiveness of earned belonging. The Article introduces 
and defines three theories of the family and then offers a descriptive 
account of how these theories were used by litigants and the Court to 
increase household equality, measure discrimination, and evaluate the 
rights of individual family members. The Article investigates the benefits 
as well as the burdens of these logics individually and describes how and 
at what points they intersect, ultimately suggesting a normative 
preference for family design based the ideology of earned treatment and 
intimate investment. 
I.  Husbands, Wives, and Home Economics 
Spearheading and collaborating with colleagues to effect much of 
the change that transformed the household in the 1970s was Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg. A scholar of civil procedure and a comparativist who was 
interested in Sweden, Ginsburg created the ACLU Women’s Rights 
Project in 1972 and was at the forefront of gender litigation in the 1970s.32 
Ginsburg wrote numerous briefs for Supreme Court cases, argued 
frequently before the Supreme Court, and still continued to publish as a 
legal and constitutional scholar.33 Excelling in each of these roles, her 
vision of an equalized household was a guiding compass in the project of 
dismantling the barriers that created separate domains for different 
categories of family members. A pioneer in bringing sophisticated 
understandings of gender politics to law, Ginsburg’s vision of gender 
equality held that men and women would “create new traditions by their 
actions, if artificial barriers [were] removed, and avenues of opportunity 
held open to them.”34 A first step in instantiating this vision was getting 
 
 32. See Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU (Mar. 7, 2006), 
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff. 
 33. Carol Pressman, The House That Ruth Built: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and 
Justice, 14 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 311, 314–15 (1998). 
 34. Kenneth M. Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Herma Hill Kay, Sex-Based 
Discrimination: Text, Cases, and Materials, at xii–xiii (1974). 
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the Court to strike down “[t]housands of state laws, most of them historical 
hangovers, [that] typecast men and women.”35 Litigating Reed v. Reed was 
an important opening move. Reed gave Ginsburg the full opportunity to 
articulate both her analysis of historical gender discrimination as well as 
her understanding of the untenable way in which “historical hangovers”36 
were negatively impacting women’s equal opportunity. Reed was a 
foundational underpinning in Ginsburg’s strategy to equalize the rights 
held by men and women with respect to home management and 
economy. The broad goal was nothing less than the disruption and end of 
coverture law. 
A.  REED V. REED: Dismantling the Historic Household 
The facts in Reed were simple and allowed Ginsburg to press 
forcefully on the idea of legal “historical hangovers.” When Richard 
Lynn Reed, the adopted son of Sally and Cecil Reed, died intestate on 
March 29, 1967, his parents—and only heirs—were separated and living 
apart.37 Sally Reed went to the Ada County courthouse in Idaho and filed 
her petition for probate of her son’s estate, requesting that she be named 
administrator of his estate.38 Cecil Reed also petitioned the court for 
letters of administration.39 The probate court entered an order appointing 
Cecil Reed administrator, noting that each of the parties was equally 
entitled to letters of administration under the Idaho probate code,40 but 
that the probate code also entitled Mr. Reed to preference on account of 
his sex.41 The relevant provision in the probate code stated: “Of several 
persons claiming and equally entitled . . . to administer, males must be 
preferred to females, and relatives of the whole to those of the half 
blood.”42 Sally Reed appealed and the Idaho district court reversed the 
order of the probate court on the grounds that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. Cecil Reed subsequently appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Idaho, who reversed the district court,43 and the case finally 
made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Writing the brief for the Supreme Court case, Ginsburg began with 
a substantive overview of the historical landscape informing the 
gendered partitioning of separate spheres. Citing to Blackstone’s famous 
 
 35. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 174. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 71 (1971). 
 38. Id. at 71–72. 
 39. Id. at 72. 
 40. Id. at 73. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (quoting Idaho Code Ann. § 15-314 (1942)). 
 43. Id. at 74. 
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formulation of coverture44 as well as to Tennyson’s verse, Ginsburg hit 
the historical note, observing that the “common law heritage, a source of 
pride for men, marked the wife as her husband’s chattel, ‘something 
better than his dog, a little dearer than his horse.’”45 That concept of 
family governance, she suggested, still held strong in the modern 
formulation of “head of the family” and served as an organizing principle 
for family life. In many states, Ginsburg pointed out, “head of 
household” statutes were still on the books.46 An Idaho statute, on the 
books at the time, stated that: “The husband is the head of the family. He 
may choose any reasonable place or mode of living and the wife must 
conform thereto.”47 These laws—holdovers from coverture—were 
ubiquitous in both federal and state statutory regulation and gave men, 
as heads of household, all rights of family governance, including the right 
to choose a domicile and the right to manage and allocate family assets.48 
In contrast, married women suffered from a range of disabilities due to 
their status as wives. Wives had limited ability to engage in independent 
business outside the home (following the historic sole trader laws) and 
often were unable to act as full and independent financial agents, for 
example as a guarantor for assets.49 An appendix to the Reed brief listed 
nine areas, ranging from the right to determine domicile to the preference 
for males in guardianship of minors and as estate administrators, in 
which coverture law embedded in statutes still detrimentally affected 
married women.50 
Case law, Ginsburg suggested, was little better, and the common law 
tradition also made manifest the discrimination and typecasting that 
continued to plague women, most especially married women.51 Only a 
decade before Reed, in Hoyt v. Florida, the Court had stated that the 
“woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.”52 Citing 
other examples of the “Victorian” thinking that still held sway in the 
form of persistent gender stereotyping, Ginsburg also referred to 
Goesaert v. Cleary,53 in which the Court had upheld a Michigan law 
 
 44. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 27–28. Blackstone’s formulation of coverture was that 
“the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.” 
1 Blackstone, supra note 5, at 442; see Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 28. 
 45. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 27 (citing Alfred Lord Tennyson, Locksley Hall, in 
Poems (1842)). 
 46. Id. at 32. 
 47. Id. (quoting Idaho Code Ann. § 32-902 (1942)). 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 69–88. 
 49. See id. at 60–65. 
 50. Id. at 69–88. 
 51. See id. at 41–54. 
 52. 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). 
 53. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
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prohibiting women from serving as bartenders (but allowing them to be 
waitresses in a bar): “The majority opinion in Goesaert reflects an 
antiquarian male attitude towards women—man as provider, man as 
protector, man as guardian of female morality.”54 Both statutes and cases, 
Ginsburg concluded, “illustrate [that] the law-sanctioned subordination 
of wife to husband, mother to father, woman to man, is not yet 
extinguished in this country.”55 Historic household status was still 
circumscribing the place and power of modern women who, Ginsburg 
believed, deserved a position within and opportunity outside of the 
household equal to men. 
Clarifying the notion that this historical discrimination was based on 
nothing other than the accident of gender and bolstering the idea of 
historical discrimination’s modern inappositeness, Ginsburg’s approach 
was to put the analogy between race and gender front and center. 
Drawing on the work of Pauli Murray, Ginsburg wrote that “[l]egal and 
social proscriptions based upon race and sex have often been identical, 
and have generally implied the inherent inferiority of the proscribed class 
to a dominant group. Both classes have been defined by, and 
subordinated to, the same power group—white males.”56 The relationship 
between the two identity groups was more, however, than a strict 
historical transference of race-based claims into the domain of gender. 
Ginsburg suggested that there was a fluid boundary between the two 
groups: 
[H]istory of western culture, and particularly of ecclesiastical and 
English common law, suggests that the traditionally subordinate status 
of women provided models for the oppression of other groups. The 
treatment of a woman as her husband’s property, as subject to his 
corporal punishment, as incompetent to testify under canon law, and as 
subject to numerous legal and social restrictions based upon sex, were 
precedents for the later treatment of slaves.57 
Race and gender both were historical markers of inequality that 
were mutually reinforcing, justified through the logic of the dominant 
class, and made visible through household organization. Race and gender 
 
 54. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 46. 
 55. Id. at 48. 
 56. Id. at 18–19. As Reva Siegel has explained regarding the durability of historical household 
hierarchy, 
Anglo-American common law situated persons in explicitly hierarchical relationships. Thus, 
the common law organized the “domestic” relations of husband/wife and master/servant as 
relations of governance and dependence, with the law specifying the rights and obligations 
of superior and inferior parties. The American common law modeled chattel slavery on this 
“domestic” analogue as well. 
Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing 
State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1114 (1997) (quoting Pauli Murray, The Negro Woman’s Stake in 
the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 253, 257 (1971)). 
 57. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 18. 
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were, as Ginsburg emphasized, “categories of differentiation” that had 
been similarly deployed in order to justify unequal treatment.58 
What the race analogy also stressed was that discriminatory treatment 
based on either race or gender was both unearned and undeserved.59 In 
this “grandmother brief”60—the matriarch and progenitor of a string of 
briefs that would come after Reed—Ginsburg was “seeking to 
demonstrate that in most contexts, to make assumptions about 
individuals based on such immutable characteristics was a violation of 
basic principles of equality and fairness.”61 Discrimination on the basis of 
gender had no grounding in individual behavior and was therefore 
injurious because of the lack of correspondence between personal action 
and earned outcome.62 Ginsburg highlighted this idea by stating that it 
was “impermissible to distinguish on the basis of an unalterable 
identifying trait over which the individual has no control.”63 For 
Ginsburg, one signal importance of the race-gender analogy was located 
in the idea that gender, like race, was not an intrinsic marker of blame or 
reward and therefore could not be a factor in creating structures of legal 
disadvantage. “Legislative discrimination grounded on sex, for purposes 
unrelated to any biological difference between the sexes, ranks with 
legislative discrimination based on race, another congenital, unalterable 
trait of birth, and merits no greater judicial deference.”64 Determining the 
capacity of an individual to be an estate administrator on the basis of sex, 
Ginsburg argued, was invalid because “differences between the sexes 
bear no relationship to the duties performed by an administrator.”65 
History was not, in fact, destiny, and Ginsburg stated that “however 
much some men may wish to preserve Victorian notions about woman’s 
relation to man, and the ‘proper’ role of women in society, the law 
cannot provide support for obsolete male prejudices or translate them 
into statutes that enforce sex-based discrimination.”66 
The Supreme Court agreed. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the 
Court, found that legitimate state interests in avoiding intrafamily conflict 
 
 58. See Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1789, 1798 
(2008). 
 59. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 20. 
 60. Mayeri, supra note 58, at 1798. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 5–6. 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 7. Because gender was like race, gender also deserved to occupy a special status in legal 
analysis as a “‘suspect classification’ requiring close judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 5. Invoking the heightened 
scrutiny applied to race-based cases, Ginsburg stated that “the Idaho Code, mandating subordination 
of women to men without regard to individual capacity, creates a ‘suspect classification’ for which no 
compelling justification can be shown.” Id. at 9. 
 66. Id. at 46. 
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and expediting probate court processes by giving preference to men as 
administrators did not overcome the need to consider women as 
mandated by equal protection law.67 With this holding, the Court signaled 
a new judicial understanding of gender and gave voice to the great 
possibility that gender-based law reflected historical prejudices rather 
than natural capacities. Likewise, the decision signaled that local rules 
governing private household economies were subject to constitutional 
analysis and intervention, putting states on notice. In the constellation of 
cases that Ginsburg and her colleagues argued following Reed, the 
Court’s understanding of gender as a historical construct deepened and 
the Court struck down a panoply of “archaic”68 laws meant to perpetuate 
gender stereotypes about household provisioning and to entrench the 
notion of the traditional separate spheres. In the same cases, the Court 
also picked up on Ginsburg’s implicit proposition that equal treatment 
meant evaluating family members according to their contributions and 
earned rights instead of historical household status. In this way, the 
Court began to work out a theory of the family absent historical values 
and based on the concept of earning. 
B.  Rejecting “Archaic” Law and Rewarding Work 
On the heels of Reed, Ginsburg found a cadre of new cases that, like 
Reed, highlighted how outdated assumptions about household 
provisioning still animated law. Using tactics similar to those in Reed, 
Ginsburg focused on the unequal treatment of men and women who 
were similarly situated and strategically took on cases that showcased 
men being victimized by the gender presumptions inherent in both state 
and federal statutes. Focusing on formal equality enriched by an 
antistereotyping principle, as Cary Franklin notes, “Ginsburg pressed the 
claims of male plaintiffs in order to promote a new theory of equal 
protection founded on an antistereotyping principle. . . . [that] dictated 
that the state could not act in ways that reflected or reinforced traditional 
conceptions of men’s and women’s roles.”69 Cases like Frontiero v. 
Richardson,70 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,71 and Califano v. Goldfarb72 all 
 
 67. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). “To give a mandatory preference to members of 
either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, 
is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 76. Justice Burger also went so far as to mention that, although the 
Court had not been asked to rule on any question concerning the section that set out the order of 
preference for administrators—rather the challenge was to the “modifying appendage” that gave 
direction in cases of conflict—the question of gender equity was equally present in that section as well 
because of the higher level of preference given to brothers over sisters in the hierarchy. Id. at 77. 
 68. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975). 
 69. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 
85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 88 (2010). 
 70. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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targeted statutes based on the logic of coverture—presuming that a wife 
had no economic identity apart from her husband—and Ginsburg 
litigated these cases to redress the gender inequity embedded in the 
statutory allotment of economic benefits. These cases struck at the dying 
heart of coverture and effectively eliminated persistent traces of a wife’s 
economic disability that still existed in both state and federal statutory 
schemes. The cases also did significant work in undoing the gender-based 
typecasting that created and perpetuated the notion of separate spheres 
for husbands and wives. Women, as Ginsburg argued in her brief for 
Reed, could no longer be relegated to a domestic sphere while men 
exclusively participated in the sphere of the market and economic 
earning.73 In deciding these cases, the Court demonstrated a strong sense 
of the need to replace historical understandings of gender roles as 
evident in statutory schemes with an updated concept of the family. As 
the series of cases unfolded, the Court worked through and began to 
articulate just such an updated concept, based on ideas of work, earnings, 
and just reward. 
1. The Reality of Romantic Paternalism: “Not on a Pedestal, but in a 
Cage” 
Two years after Reed came Frontiero v. Richardson, a due process 
case about the unequal allotment of military benefits to spouses 
according to gender and the first case that Ginsburg tried before the 
Supreme Court.74 The question at hand was why the military 
automatically granted certain benefits to a serviceman with a wife, but 
required a servicewoman to prove that her husband was dependent on 
her for more than one-half of his support.75 Justice Brennan, writing for 
the plurality, came out in strong support of Frontiero’s claim and, 
following Ginsburg’s argument from Reed, went to great lengths to 
highlight the historical discrimination faced by women. Using and citing 
a substantial amount of material from Ginsburg’s Reed brief,76 Brennan 
wrote: “There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and 
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such 
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ 
 
 71. 420 U.S. 636. 
 72. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
 73. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 25–26. 
 74. 411 U.S. at 678–79. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Justice Brennan cites to Kirsten Amundsen, The Silenced Majority: Women and American 
Democracy (1971); Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution (1969); 
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma 1073 (20th anniversary ed. 1962); The President’s Task 
Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities, A Matter of Simple Justice (1970); Note, Sex 
Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 
1499, 1507 (1971). 
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which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”77 
Demonstrating a strong responsiveness to the historical argument and 
the logic of legal modernization, Justice Brennan remarked on the 
changing status of women in American society, saying, “It is true, of 
course, that the position of women in America has improved markedly in 
recent decades. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part 
because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face 
pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination.”78 Justice 
Brennan also observed that institutional change was afoot, adding that 
“over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing 
sensitivity to sex-based classifications.”79 
Continuing to reason from history, Brennan adopted Ginsburg’s 
analogy between gender- and race-based discrimination to highlight the 
burden of historical discrimination that women had faced because of 
coverture law: 
[O]ur statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped 
distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 
19th century the position of women in our society was, in many 
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave 
codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or 
bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were 
denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal 
guardians of their own children.80 
Intent on finding the structural parallels, Justice Brennan may have 
elided some of the more subtle and connective parts of Ginsburg’s 
analogy, failing to recognize the unique history of gender discrimination81 
or the intersectionality between race and gender claims.82 Nonetheless, 
the analogy proved eminently useful in the sense that “it recast practices 
 
 77. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685. Justice Brennan observed (as Ginsburg had in both the Frontiero 
and Reed briefs) that, while conditions for women were improving, women still constituted a minority 
in positions of political and economic power. Id. at 686. Justice Brennan mentioned, pointedly, that 
there had never been “a female member of this Court.” Id. at 686 n.17. 
 78. Id. at 685–86 (footnotes omitted). 
 79. Id. at 687. 
 80. Id. at 685. 
 81. Reva Siegel has pointed out that “the analogy between race and sex that founds sex 
discrimination jurisprudence would seem to be premised on the assumption that there is no 
constitutional history of relevance to sex discrimination law.” Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The 
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 963 (2002). 
Siegel suggests that, while history is a directive principle in Frontiero, there “is no suggestion in 
Frontiero, or in subsequent opinions of the Court, that history might help identify the traditional sites 
or distinctive forms of discrimination directed against women.” Id. at 962. 
 82. Serena Mayeri notes, “Although the WRP briefs recounted the interconnections between 
struggles for racial justice and women’s rights campaigns, the analogy articulated by Justice Brennan 
in the Frontiero plurality opinion was merely comparative rather than connective.” Serena Mayeri, “A 
Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 
110 Yale L.J. 1045, 1075 (2001). 
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once viewed as chivalric concessions to women as discrimination worthy 
of redress.”83 
Speculating about the presence of “chivalric concessions” in 
legislative intent with respect to the differential treatment of male and 
female servicemembers, Justice Brennan presumed that the intent 
corresponded with the assumption that “the husband in our society is 
generally the ‘breadwinner’ in the family.”84 Whereas Reed had 
challenged the general notion that a man rather than a woman was better 
suited to administering household affairs, Frontiero upended the 
underlying assumption that gave substance to the “head of household” 
theory—breadwinning.85 Frontiero was, in this way, a radical extension of 
Reed because the Frontiero decision questioned the time-honored 
assumption that a man was the family breadwinner while his wife was the 
economic dependent.86 Contradicting the norms of historical household 
provisioning, Frontiero confronted the Court with a modern example of 
household ordering in which the wife was the primary breadwinner and 
the husband her dependent—in contravention of all the premises of 
coverture—and asked why a husband should be disadvantaged solely 
because he was enacting a nontraditional household status.87 
Using the dual precedents of Reed and Frontiero, the Court 
subsequently proceeded to take on two cases very similar to Frontiero in 
that they involved unequal benefits for men and women. The first, 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, in 1974 involved the Social Security provision 
gamely entitled “Mother’s insurance benefits,” which allowed for 
differential allocation of benefits based on whether the earnings were 
from a deceased husband and father or a deceased wife and mother.88 
Two years after Wiesenfeld, the Social Security Act was once again at 
issue in Califano v. Goldfarb, this time with respect to the Federal Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits program.89 The program 
regulated survivor benefits such that benefits based on the earnings of a 
deceased husband were payable to the widow without question, while 
 
 83. Mayeri, supra note 58, at 1799. 
 84. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 681. Such an assumption, the district court had suggested, would 
produce “a considerable saving of administrative expense and manpower.” Id. at 681–82. Justice 
Brennan, however, observed that “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and 
efficiency.” Id. at 690 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)). And citing subsequently to 
Reed, Justice Brennan concluded that “any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the 
sexes, [s]olely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience . . . involves the ‘very kind of 
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution].’” Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (citing Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). 
 85. See 411 U.S. at 681.  
 86. See id.  
 87. See id. 
 88. 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.1 (1975). 
 89. 430 U.S. 199, 201–02 (1977). 
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benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife were payable to 
the widower only if he had been receiving over half of his support from 
his deceased wife.90 
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in both cases and in both 
decisions he made clear the outdated nature of the legislative 
assumptions undergirding the statutes. Justice Brennan pointed out in 
Wiesenfeld that the legislative purpose of “Mother’s insurance benefits” 
was to protect widowed mothers who, presumably, were not and never 
had been a part of the labor market and therefore would require extra 
support.91 The opinion stated, however, that this supposition was based 
on “an ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalization not tolerated under the 
Constitution, namely, that male workers’ earnings are vital to their 
families’ support, while female workers’ earnings do not significantly 
contribute to families’ support.”92 In Goldfarb, the inherent presumption 
was identical—that “wives are usually dependent.”93 Justice Stevens 
explained, in a concurrence, that “this discrimination against a group of 
males [was] merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of 
thinking about females.”94 Both Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan 
repeated the phrasing of Wiesenfeld and stated that these presumptions 
concerning gender and the traditional roles of provider and dependent 
were “based on ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations”95 about gender 
roles and the household economy. Ginsburg, writing about Goldfarb, 
stated that “the Court thus understood that equations of the kind 
embraced in the Social Security Act, lump classifications still riddling 
federal and state lawbooks, channel and constrain individuals.”96 In every 
one of these of the cases, Ginsburg’s argument for dismantling the 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. 420 U.S. at 648–49. 
 92. Id. at 636. 
 93. 430 U.S at 217. 
 94. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring). Wiesenfeld, besides challenging the idea of the male 
breadwinner, also brought up the question of the father as parent and challenged the idea that the 
husband would not be available for or interested in taking care of the child was also out of place in this 
new family design. 420 U.S. at 651–53.  
[The] fact that a man is working while there is a wife at home does not mean that he would, 
or should be required to, continue to work if his wife dies. It is no less important for a child 
to be cared for by its sole surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female.  
Id. at 651–52. Recognizing the dual gender stereotypes at work in the logic of the Act—mothers as 
good dependents and fathers as unlikely caretakers—Justice Brennan observed that fathers had 
custody and care rights equal to those of mothers and cited to the case of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645 (1972), which the Court had heard three years earlier with the result of increased due process 
rights for widowers with respect to caretaking claims. See Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 227. The synchronicity 
between the two cases enabled Wiesenfeld to offer a wide window into the allocation of family roles 
and facilitate a deep understanding of the antistereotyping principle, focusing as the case did on 
disassembling multiple forms of family stereotypes. 
 95. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 207, 224. 
 96. Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 470. 
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historical household model found favor with the Court, gained new 
momentum for gender-based claims, and dealt a new blow to the 
calcified perimeters of separate spheres. 
2.  Earned Protection and Dignity for Families 
Building on Ginsburg’s argument of earned treatment—that gender-
based discrimination was unfair because it failed to recognize the 
relationship between behavior and outcome—the cases that followed 
Reed also paid great attention, as well as tribute, to the work done by 
wives on behalf of their families. Ignoring the connection between 
behavior and reward, the Court concluded in Frontiero, was not only 
unconstitutional but also contravened an American sense of democracy. 
Citing to Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., a case about the 
unequal rights of illegitimate children, Justice Brennan observed that 
gender-based discrimination violated “the basic concept of our system 
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility.”97 Gender-based categorizations were constitutionally 
unacceptable because the “sex characteristic frequently bears no relation 
to ability to perform or contribute to society.”98 The related ideas of 
performance for and contribution to both polity and family became an 
organizing principle for family and offered a central value for 
determining the strength and cohesion of a family. 
The Court reiterated this theme from Frontiero and connected 
action with outcome in both Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb. Paula Wiesenfeld, 
the Court mentioned, had “worked as a teacher for five years before her 
marriage, [and] continued teaching after her marriage. Each year she 
worked, maximum social security contributions were deducted from her 
salary. Paula’s earnings were the couple’s principal source of support 
during the marriage, being substantially larger than those of appellee.”99 
Paula Wiesenfeld had put in long hours at work and paid all her social 
security tax through her paychecks in order to obtain economic security 
for the family.100 To withhold her benefits from her husband upon her 
death, the Court plainly stated, was unfair. Such deprivation meant that 
Paula Wiesenfeld “not only failed to receive for her family the same 
protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received, 
but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to 
contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others.”101 
The gender stereotyping inherent in the statute was unconstitutional, the 
 
 97. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 639.  
 100. Id. at 645. 
 101. Id.  
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Court observed, but so was the “gender-based differentiation that results 
in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security taxes 
producing less protection for their families than is produced by the 
efforts of men.”102 
Similarly, in Goldfarb, the Court led with the fact that “Mrs. 
Hannah Goldfarb worked as a secretary in the New York City public 
school system for almost 25 years until her death in 1968. During that 
entire time she paid in full all social security taxes.”103 Hannah Goldfarb 
was “survived by her husband, Leon Goldfarb . . . a retired federal 
employee,” who applied for widower’s benefits and was subsequently 
denied.104 Addressing this denial of benefits, the Goldfarb Court cited 
extensively and approvingly from Wiesenfeld and reinforced the idea of 
fair reward for hard work.105 The Court mentioned at several points in the 
opinion that “social security taxes were deducted from Hannah Goldfarb’s 
salary during the quarter century she worked as a secretary.”106 As a 
worker and a wife, the Court concluded, “Mrs. Goldfarb was entitled to 
the dignity of knowing that her social security tax would contribute 
to . . . her husband’s welfare should she predecease him.”107 Work done 
on behalf of the family and to support the family, the Court suggested, 
was not to be diminished because of statutory historical hangovers that 
apportioned benefits according to gendered assumptions about 
breadwinning.108 Work for the family, in this case Hannah Goldfarb’s 
work done on behalf of the family, was to be valued.  
In deciding this set of cases, the Court not only marked the need for 
law to reflect the historical evolution in household norms but also 
deployed the earnings argument to equalize entitlements for husbands 
and wives. In so doing, the Court also provided a logic that pointed the 
way to a new conception of the earned family. 
II.  From FILIUS NULLIUS to Family Member 
While gender-based distinctions were being debated in the Supreme 
Court, so too were questions about legitimacy and the rights of 
nonmarital children.109 The two conversations were connected. According 
to Ginsburg, writing as a scholar, the issues of illegitimacy and gender-
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202–03 (1977).  
 104. Id. at 203. 
 105. See generally id. 
 106. Id. at 206. 
 107. Id. at 204. 
 108. Id. at 206–07. 
 109. See Kenneth Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1, 22 (1977) (“Sex discrimination, discrimination against illegitimate children or their parents, 
age discrimination, differential treatment on the basis of wealth—all have been debated . . . .”). 
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based discrimination were all part of a litigation strategy meant to 
challenge “traditional stereotypes,”110 and the two questions “present[ed] 
various faces of a single issue: the roles women are to play in society.”111 
Judging by the frequency with which Supreme Court decisions about 
gender and legitimacy referenced one another, it seemed that the Justices 
also observed an intimate connection between the two concerns. Marital 
benefits cases like Frontiero cited to illegitimacy cases like Weber, 
speaking to the idea of earned treatment. In a dissenting opinion in 
Goldfarb,112 Justice Rehnquist framed his discussion of constitutional 
doctrine and suspect classifications around the analogy between gender- 
and legitimacy-based classifications.113 Advocates like Harry Krause and 
Norman Dorsen, working for the ACLU, argued that illegitimacy, like 
race and gender, was an immutable characteristic that an individual 
acquired not through default in responsibility but through accident of 
birth.114 Additionally, illegitimacy, like race and gender, was a trait that 
historically had been used to marginalize individuals within the 
household hierarchy.115 Even into the 1970s, bastardy laws riddled state 
statute books, and the regulation of illegitimacy was “an uncertain 
mixture of old English common law tempered with occasional flashes of 
modern thought.”116 
Historically, the status of illegitimacy rendered nonmarital children 
outsiders within the conventional family, prohibited them from inheriting, 
and branded them with social opprobrium.117 Continental law, beginning 
in the late medieval period, held illegitimate children to be a social evil 
 
 110. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 14 Women’s 
Rts. L. Rep. 361, 361 (1992). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Justice Rehnquist had a string of dissenting opinions. He dissented in Frontiero, Goldfarb, 
Weber, and Trimble. Justice Rehnquist, in his Goldfarb dissent, cited administrative convenience and 
benign discrimination as the reasons for his opposition to the majority decision. Typically, Justice 
Rehnquist found that there was a rational basis for the discriminatory categories and reiterated that 
there was no judicial mandate for heightened scrutiny. 
 113. Califano, 430 U.S. at 228–42. 
 114. See Harry D. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 62 (1971). For a description of 
the collaboration between Krause and Dorsen, as well as the ACLU’s involvement in illegitimacy 
litigation, see generally Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 73 (2003). Davis writes that: 
Within the ACLU, challenges to illegitimacy classifications were reserved for the ACLU’s 
Juvenile Rights Project, which maintained a high level of activity in attacking illegitimacy 
classifications. As Norman Dorsen recalls, the child-based arguments were so compelling 
that once they were accepted by the Court in Levy, there seemed to be no pressing reason 
to try a different approach. 
Id. at 98. 
 115. Krause, supra note 114, at 2–5. 
 116. Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act on 
Legitimacy, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 829, 831 (1966). 
 117. Krause, supra note 114, at 3. 
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and a moral outrage.118 Illegitimate children were barred from holding 
public office, from appearing in court as a party or witness, and from 
receiving proper burial.119 In the common law tradition, illegitimate 
children were disabled primarily from an economic standpoint. 
Blackstone described the rights and disabilities of the bastard: 
The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot 
be heir to any one, neither can he have heirs but of his own body; for, 
being nullius filius, he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no 
ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived.120 
The illegitimate child had no surname, no home to claim, no 
inheritance, and no right to any ancestry. Because of this lack of access to 
economic resources and support, illegitimate children were often 
associated with poverty and the social strife endemic to an underclass.121 
This stereotype had strong resonance and persisted well into the 
twentieth century. “The bastard,” one sociologist wrote in 1939, “like the 
prostitute, thief, and beggar . . . is a living symbol of social irregularity, an 
undeniable evidence of contramoral forces.”122 Bastardy, as it was named 
until almost well into the 1960s, was a mark not just of parental sin but 
also of social disorder brought about by household impropriety and 
instability. By the late 1960s and 1970s, shifts in norms regarding the 
family brought about by social and political upheaval led to a 
reexamination of these types of assumptions about household 
irregularity.123 New forms of household arrangement were becoming 
mainstream, nonmarital households were increasingly common, and the 
stigma associated with illegitimacy was decreasing accordingly.124 
Advocates for illegitimate children therefore positioned modern-day 
nonmarital children as a class of individuals deserving of new judicial 
treatment that reflected these changing family and marital patterns. 
In this push for the rights of nonmarital children, the equal 
protection doctrine was key, just as it was with the gender-based claims 
of discrimination that Ginsburg and her team were making. Advocates 
for nonmarital children, such as Norman Dorsen and Harry Krause, 
carefully invoked the 1943 Supreme Court decision that proclaimed: 
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by 
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. 1 Blackstone, supra note 5, at 459. 
 121. Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Am. J. Soc. 215, 215–16 (1939). 
 122. Id. at 215. 
 123. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 345, 347 (2011) (“Societal disapproval of nonmarital 
childbearing has also decreased as nonmarital births have become more common.”). 
 124. See Larry L. Bumpass, What’s Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic 
and Institutional Change, 27 Demography 483, 488–90 (1990). 
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upon the doctrine of equality.”125 That ancestry did not create legal 
destiny was a foundational claim for the class of nonmarital children. 
Rewriting roles within the family such that flawed ancestry or inferior 
household status were not controlling factors was the lodestar of those 
advocating for the rights of women and nonmarital children. As 
Ginsburg and her colleagues brought to light, the two classes of 
individuals were bound together through ties of historic discrimination 
based on household status and “archaic” stereotypes about the family. 
Levy v. Louisiana was the first step in redeeming the rights of these 
nonmarital children and overturning another set of statutes that operated 
on the assumptions of historical heritage rather than earned reward. 
A.  LEVY V. LOUISIANA: Opening the Door for Nonmarital Children 
Writing for the Court in Levy, Justice Douglas began with a simple 
proposition: “We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not 
‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live, and have their being. They are 
clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”126 With that statement, the Court signaled 
a significant adjustment to the historical positioning of illegitimate 
children with respect to inheritance rights by allowing that illegitimate 
children were, in fact, a class of persons with rights, claims, and 
protections. Levy gave nonmarital children the right to recover for the 
wrongful death of their mother and marked the beginning of a momentous 
string of cases that fundamentally modified the rights available to 
children born outside of the conventional marital household.127 Levy also 
 
 125. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Sherrie Anne Bakelar, From “Baggage” 
to Not “Non-persons”: Levy v. Louisiana and the Struggle for Equal Rights for “Illegitimate” 
Children 150–52 (Dec. 1, 2010) (unpublished master thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas), available at 
http://digitalcommons.library.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/746. Writing a dissent in Labine v. Vincent, 
Justice Brennan also cited this line from the Hirabayashi decision. 401 U.S. 532, 558 (1971) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
 126. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968). 
 127. The ACLU and its affiliates had litigated cases that implicated the rights of individuals not 
embedded in and protected by traditional family relationships earlier in the 1960s as part of a larger 
civil rights and antipoverty agenda, winning cases such as King v. Smith, in which the “man of the 
house” rule was invalidated and the Court held that aid for dependent children could not be withheld 
because of a mother’s involvement with a “substitute father.” 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968). With Levy, 
however, the focus shifted from combating poverty to creating equal protection for all household 
members—especially nonmarital children. It was therefore unclear whether or not fundamental rights 
were at stake. As John Gray and David Rudovsky—two lawyers who helped prepare the Levy brief—
wrote:  
The Court’s characterization of the rights involved is of no small significance. If the right to 
wrongful death recovery is to be considered “basic” in our constitutional scheme, other 
economic relationships which similarly can be said to involve “intimate, familial 
relationships” would also seem to be deserving of special constitutional protections. 
John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and 
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1969). From this 
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foregrounded the themes that would appear time and time again in the 
nonmarital children cases—lifting the penalty for illegitimacy from the 
nonmarital child and recognizing the natural, if informal, relationship 
that existed between a mother and her nonmarital child. 
The Levy family’s situation was, as one historian suggests, “a sad 
one.”128 After feeling unwell for a number of days, Louise Levy was 
admitted to a local hospital and, due to a series of mistaken diagnoses 
and negligent care, died there little more than two weeks later.129 At the 
time of her death, Levy was mother to and caretaker of five nonmarital 
children.130 Bereft of economic support when their mother died, the five 
children sued for the right to recover under a Louisiana statute.131 The 
district court in Louisiana initially dismissed the case, and the court of 
appeals upheld the district court’s decision on the grounds that the state 
had a legitimate interest in discouraging couples from having children 
outside of marriage.132 The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to grant 
certiorari, and the “Levy children’s cause languished until the fall of 1967 
when [their lawyer] approached Norman Dorsen about the case and the 
possibility of arguing it before the U.S. Supreme Court.”133 
Dorsen, a New York University Law School professor and an 
ACLU colleague of Ginsburg’s, agreed to take the case and, by the 
spring of 1968, it came before the Supreme Court.134 At issue, according 
to Dorsen, was not just the historical discrimination that disadvantaged a 
class of children but also the fact that these nonmarital children had no 
agency or control over their status as illegitimate.135 Speaking to the 
 
perspective, they continued, “Levy may be read to support the emergence of preferred social and 
economic rights.” Id. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., decided same year, 
extended rights to the mother of an illegitimate child, allowing her to recover for her child’s wrongful 
death. 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968). 
 128. Bakelar, supra note 125, at 3. 
 129. Id. at 3–4. 
 130. Id. at 4. 
 131. The children asked both for damages based on the loss of their mother as well as damages 
based on the survival of a cause of action that the mother had at the time of her death for pain and 
suffering. Levy, 391 U.S. at 69–70. 
 132. Id. at 70. 
 133. Bakelar, supra note 125, at 7. 
 134. Id. at 7–8. 
 135. Id. at 3, 9–10. While Dorsen could also have chosen to focus on the race of the Levy children, 
he “did not construct his winning argument around the fact that the Levy children were African-
American” and preferred to focus on birth status alone. Id. at 3. In this way, “Dorsen’s argument 
became universal, divorcing the status of illegitimate from that of race and rendering immaterial the 
fact that the Levy children were African-American.” Id. Despite Dorsen’s choice to highlight birth 
status instead of race, a strong link—demographically and imaginatively—existed between African-
American families and illegitimacy. See Evelyn M. Kitagawa, New Life-Styles: Marriage Patterns, 
Living Arrangements, and Fertility Outside of Marriage, 453 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 1, 8–
10 (1981). Racialized discourse about African-American families—and the breakdown of these 
families—was abundant. For a famous example, see the Moynihan Report, which noted the problems 
of race and class in family formation and stability. Off. of Pol’y Planning & Research, U.S. Dep’t of 
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outdated nature of discrimination against illegitimate children, Justice 
Douglas stated in his concurrence in King v. Smith (decided in the same 
year as Levy): “This penalizing the children for the sins of their mother is 
reminiscent of the archaic corruption of the blood, a form of bill of 
attainder.”136 The same sentiment applied to the Levy’s children inability 
to recover for their mother’s wrongful death. Justice Douglas, writing for 
the Court in Levy, posited the rhetorical question: “[W]hy, in terms of 
‘equal protection,’ should the tortfeasors go free merely because the 
child is illegitimate?”137 The discrimination suffered by nonmarital 
children was both outdated and unfair.138 
The Levy children were not to blame for the failure of their parents 
to become legally bound in marriage; they had caused no harm and had 
violated no laws. The fact of their existence violated a social norm—
albeit a changing one—but penalizing the children for their birth 
allocated blame to the wrong parties, the Court observed. As 
contributing and upstanding citizens, the Levy children were being 
unfairly denied rights and remedies. The Levy children, the Court 
suggested, merited equal citizenship if only because they were “subject to 
all the responsibilities of a citizen, including the payment of taxes and 
conscription under the Selective Service Act.”139 Reasoning in this way, it 
was “invidious to discriminate”140 against the Levy children when “no 
action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs [was] possibly relevant to the 
harm that was done the mother.”141 This idea of indexing treatment to 
behavior was a motif that appeared repeatedly in the cases that followed, 
as the Court continued to develop the idea of the distribution of family-
based rights according to earned penalty or reward. 
If earned treatment was one motif, a second motif that Justice 
Douglas wove through the opinion was that of the natural affection 
between a mother and her child. This maternal affection was so strong 
that it did not diminish even in the absence of a formal family structure.142 
As Justice Douglas observed with respect to the Levy children, “[t]he 
rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a 
 
Labor, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action 5 (1965) (“The white family has achieved 
a high degree of stability and is maintaining that stability. By contrast, the family structure of lower 
class Negroes is highly unstable, and in many urban centers is approaching complete breakdown.”). 
 136. 392 U.S. 309, 336 n.5 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 137. 391 U.S. at 71. 
 138. Id. Citing King Lear, Justice Douglas brought poetry to the cause, proclaiming, “We can say 
with Shakespeare: ‘Why bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are as well compact, My mind 
as generous, and my shape as true, As honest madam’s issue? Why brand they us With base? with 
baseness? bastardy? base, base?’” Id. at 72 n.6 (quoting William Shakespeare, King Lear act 2, sc. 2). 
 139. Id. at 71. 
 140. Id. at 72. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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child and his own mother.”143 The relationship, he continued, was a 
unique and natural one that did not change according to the mother’s 
marital status: “Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the 
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, 
though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and 
nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the 
spiritual sense.”144 
Responsive to this unique relationship, the Court honed in on the 
fact that Louise Levy had loved her children and raised them with strong 
moral values. Louise Levy had “treated them as a parent would treat any 
other child”145and worked steadily as a “domestic servant”146 in order to 
be able to provide for the children. In addition, Louise Levy had sent her 
children to parochial school and gone to church with them on Sundays.147 
Reviewing Louise Levy’s behavior toward her children, the Court easily 
and with no dissent confirmed the position put forward by the Levy 
children’s counsel that “the mothers of illegitimate children were just as 
central to a child’s life as the mothers of legitimate children.”148 In this 
way, the Court deconstructed the barrier between the marital and 
nonmarital family—at least as defined by the mother and child—adding 
further justification to ending the differential treatment of marital and 
nonmarital children.149 
With Levy, then, the Court took a fundamental first step by bringing 
the nonmarital children into the family fold and making available to 
them the same legal remedies available to marital children. Nonmarital 
children were no longer strictly confined to a lower rung on the 
hierarchical ladder of the historical household and Levy thus “laid the 
groundwork for a series of cases that continued to expand legal 
protection for nonmarital children, including access to welfare benefits, 
and paternal visitation rights and financial support.”150 As the Levy 
 
 143. Id. at 71. 
 144. Id. at 72. 
 145. Id. at 70. 
 146. Id. The Court’s portrayal of Louise Levy was also laden with racial stereotypes. The Court, in 
describing Louise Levy, implicitly evoked the stereotype of a “Mammy” whose “primary role was 
domestic service, characterized by long hours of work with little or no financial compensation. 
Subordination, nurturance, and constant self-sacrifice were expected.” Carolyn M. West, Mammy, 
Sapphire, and Jezebel: Historical Images of Black Women and Their Implications for Psychotherapy, 
32 Psychotherapy: Theory, Res., Prac., Training 458, 459 (1995). 
 147. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70. 
 148. Bakelar, supra note 125, at 5. 
 149. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note 27, at 1255. Citing to Levy, Ristroph and Murray mention 
that “[i]n constitutional and state law alike, several efforts have been made to update the legal 
understanding of the family to reflect the increasing diversity of family life” but argue that legal 
protection is available only when the informal family acts as though it were a formal one. Id. at 1256. 
 150. Bakelar, supra note 125, at 11. See generally Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986); Pickett v. 
Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 
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decision also made clear, future determinations about the rights of 
nonmarital children would be based on the concepts of earned treatment 
and the validity of certain informal family arrangements. 
B.  Flawed Incentive Structures and the Psychology of the 
Natural Family 
Like Reed, Levy was important because of the ruling and the 
precedential support it provided. Levy did not provide a roadmap for all 
questions—the level of scrutiny to be applied by the Court was still 
unclear and, as Harry Krause pointed out: “Since the common law curse 
of filius nullius still affects the relationship between the illegitimate and 
his father, the interesting question about the Levy case is whether it will 
be extended to the father-child relationship.”151 The Court continued to 
waver on the question of scrutiny for two decades after Levy, but the 
question of the father-child relationship was answered by the case that 
followed Levy. The father-child relationship, which was addressed 
mainly in the context of the nonmarital child’s right to recover or to 
claim support, was relatively simple because the “illegitimate’s claim 
against his father does not rest on an analogy to his claim against his 
mother. Rather, it rests on comparison with the legitimate child’s rights 
against his father.”152 Determinations about the fitness and character of 
unwed fathers were put aside for hearing in other contexts. To the 
benefit of nonmarital children, the Court focused on dismantling the 
structural stigma that subordinated nonmarital children to their marital 
counterparts. 
1. “Illogical and Unjust”: Transforming the Logic of Illegitimacy 
The next big case—and the case that answered the question about the 
father-child relationship—was Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. in 
1972.153 Weber determined that Louisiana workmen’s compensation laws 
that disallowed dependent unacknowledged, illegitimate children from 
recovering on an equal footing with dependent legitimate children 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.154 Writing for the plurality in 
 
(1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 
(1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); 
Glona v. Am. Guar. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 151. Harry D. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana—First Decisions 
on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 338, 339 (1969). 
 152. Id. at 340–41. 
 153. 406 U.S. at 164. 
 154. Id. at 165. In 1967, when Henry Clyde Stokes died from work-related injuries, he had been 
living with Willie Mae Weber, the mother of his two illegitimate children. Id. Stokes’ four legitimate 
children also lived with Stokes and Weber because Stokes’ legal wife had been committed to a mental 
hospital. Id. Stokes’ four legitimate children filed a claim for their father’s death under Louisiana’s 
workmen’s compensation law. Id. at 165–66. Subsequently, Stokes’ employer impleaded Willie Mae 
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Weber, Justice Powell followed the path cleared by Levy and invoked the 
interrelated logics of penalty and disability in order to reject the 
historical status of the illegitimate child.155 Speaking to the historical 
household position of and discrimination against illegitimate children, 
Justice Powell evoked democratic and meritocratic values to sustain the 
force of the Court’s holding, penning sentences that were cited freely and 
frequently in the cases after Weber: 
  The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s 
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. 
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and 
unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is 
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.156 
At a minimum, Justice Powell and his colleagues observed, disability had 
to be tied to damaging behavior, and punishment as well as reward had 
to be earned. 
This logic of earned outcome and individual responsibility was so 
strong, the Court observed, that it trumped a state’s interest in 
encouraging marriage and the state’s right to determine the optimal form 
for family operations.157 Previous to Weber coming before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court had held that the State of 
Louisiana had an important interest in encouraging the formation of 
legitimate, formal families.158 While not denying this state interest in 
encouraging marriage, Justice Powell and his colleagues doubted that 
penalizing illegitimate offspring helped attain that end: “Nor can it be 
thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring 
may not one day reap the benefits of workmen’s compensation.”159 The 
State did have an interest in setting up an incentive structure that 
promoted marriage, the Court allowed, but not if the incentive structure 
penalized the wrong party—the illegitimate children.160 
 
Weber, who appeared and claimed compensation benefits for the two illegitimate children. Id. at 166. 
While this suit was working its way through the system, the four legitimate children received a 
settlement that exceeded the benefits allowable under workmen’s compensation for a tort claim 
against a third party. Id. The illegitimate children did not share in that settlement and when the four 
legitimate children dismissed the workmen’s compensation claim because the settlement had provided 
them with the maximum allowable amount of compensation, the illegitimate children were left with 
nothing. Id.  
 155. Id. at 171–72. 
 156. Id. at 175. 
 157. “The judicial task here is the difficult one of vindicating constitutional rights without 
interfering unduly with the State’s primary responsibility in this area.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 
762, 771 (1977). 
 158. 406 U.S. at 173. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 175. 
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The Court deployed identical logic in Trimble v. Gordon when it 
addressed legitimacy-based discrimination embedded in intestacy default 
rules.161 In that case, the relevant part of the Illinois Probate Act provided 
at the time that illegitimate children could inherit by intestate succession 
only from their mothers, even though under Illinois law legitimate children 
were able to inherit by intestate succession from both their mothers and 
their fathers.162 As the state court had in Weber, the Illinois Supreme Court 
in Trimble upheld the constitutionality of the discriminatory provision 
because it supported “state interests in encouraging family 
relationships.”163 Taking up this point in the U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
Justice Powell began by asserting, “No one disputes the appropriateness of 
Illinois’ concern with the family unit, perhaps the most fundamental social 
institution of our society.”164 However, he continued, citing to Weber, “no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an 
ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”165 Justice 
Powell added that “parents have the ability to conform their conduct to 
societal norms, but their illegitimate children can affect neither their 
parents’ conduct nor their own status.”166 One year after Weber, in Gomez 
v. Perez, the Court articulated the crux of the issue even more clearly, 
stating that there was “no constitutionally sufficient justification for 
denying such an essential right to [support] a child simply because its 
natural father has not married its mother.”167 
Rejecting the idea of visiting punishment for the parents on the 
children, the Court also rejected the idea that bonds of affection and 
 
 161. 430 U.S. at 763–64. The Court had addressed intestacy law with respect to illegitimate 
children in 1971 with Labine v. Vincent, with no finding of discrimination. 401 U.S. 532, 533 (1971). 
Deta Mona Trimble was the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon and had 
lived with both of her parents until her father’s death by homicide in 1974. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 763–
64. The year before Gordon’s death, an Illinois circuit court had entered a paternity order finding 
Gordon to be Deta Mona’s father and had ordered Gordon to pay weekly support. Id. at 764. Gordon 
had also openly acknowledged Deta Mona as his daughter. Id. When Gordon died, Deta Mona’s 
mother filed a petition for determination of heirship, from which Deta Mona was excluded by the 
court. Id.  
 162. Id. at 764–65 (“An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of 
any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an 
illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by descent, any estate which the parent would 
have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-marry and who is acknowledged 
by the father as the father’s child is legitimate.” (quoting 3 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 12 (1973))). 
 163. Id. at 766. 
 164. Id. at 769. 
 165. Id. at 770 (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175). This same phrase was also cited by the Court a 
decade later in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973) (per 
curiam). 
 166. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770. 
 167. 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam). The Court recognized “lurking problems with respect 
to proof of paternity. Those problems are not to be lightly brushed aside, but neither can they be made 
into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination.” Id. 
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affinity (as well as those of economic dependence) did not connect an 
informal family in the same way they did a formal family. When Weber 
had come before the Louisiana Supreme Court, that court had suggested 
that illegitimate children were not within the scope of a family’s concern 
in the way legitimate children were.168 Addressing this argument, Justice 
Powell observed, “The illegitimate, so this argument runs, may thus be 
made less eligible for the statutory recoveries and inheritances reserved 
for those more likely to be within the ambit of familial care and 
affection.”169 Rejecting assumptions about the place of illegitimate 
children in the traditional family, Justice Powell stated that “the 
dependency and natural affinity of the unacknowledged illegitimate 
children for their father were as great as those of the four legitimate 
children . . . . The legitimate children and the illegitimate children all 
lived in the home of the deceased and were equally dependent upon him 
for maintenance and support.”170 In this way, the Court acknowledged 
that an informal family could operate in substantially the same way as a 
formal family and effectively erased the boundary line that had kept 
illegitimate children from benefiting from family membership. What 
made the informal family look a great deal like the formal one was the 
economic interdependence of its members and the investment that each 
family member made toward the unit, whether economic or affective. 
2. The Physical and Emotional Toll of Being an Unwed Mother 
Another way in which the Supreme Court enlarged protections 
available to nonmarital children was by invalidating statute of limitation 
laws in many states that prematurely foreclosed the nonmarital child or 
the child’s mother from seeking support from an absent father. 
Invalidating these statutes of limitation served the same purpose of 
putting nonmarital children on the same economic footing as marital 
children. In all of these cases, the Court gave additional attention to the 
status of the unwed mother and her psychology, further validating the 
natural link between the unwed mother and her nonmarital child. 
Without passing judgment on the question of parental fitness or making 
any comparison between mothers and fathers, these cases all assumed a 
caretaker mother and an absent father, subsequently focusing on the 
right of the illegitimate child to seek support from the father. 
The first of these cases was Mills v. Habluetzel.171 Mills came in 
response to Gomez,172 after which Texas had established a procedure for 
 
 168. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 171 (1972). 
 169. Id. at 173. 
 170. Id. at 169–70. 
 171. 456 U.S. 91 (1982). 
 172. In 1973, the Court expanded the rights of illegitimate children to claim support from 
biological, but not legal, fathers. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam). The case of 
Tait_63-HLJ-1365 (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2012 8:25 PM 
June 2012] A TALE OF THREE FAMILIES 1375 
nonmarital children seeking paternal support.173 The statutory provision 
required that the nonmarital child come forward with proof of paternity 
in order to establish a claim for support before the child’s first birthday, 
and failing that the suit was barred.174 The result was “a one-year window 
in its previously ‘impenetrable barrier,’ through which an illegitimate 
child may establish paternity and obtain paternal support.”175 The Court 
found this window inadequate.176 As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her 
concurrence to Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, there were many 
practical as well as psychological reasons for extending the right beyond 
one year.177 A mother who was receiving child support might be unlikely 
to jeopardize the support by filing a paternity suit in order to protect her 
child’s right.178 In addition, the mother’s reluctance to file a paternity suit 
could stem, Justice O’Connor suggested, “from the emotional strain of 
having an illegitimate child, or even from the desire to avoid community 
and family disapproval [and] may continue years after the child is 
born.”179 As Justice O’Connor observed: “The problem may be 
exacerbated if, as often happens, the mother herself is a minor.”180 The 
one-year rule penalized nonmarital children for what could be an 
unending set of complicated family circumstances and effectively barred 
the child from receiving support except in the most limited of 
circumstances.181 
 
Gomez arose in Texas, where the statutory scheme regulating child support required a father to 
support his legitimate children, both during a marriage and after divorce as well, and considered the 
failure to do so as subject to criminal sanction. Id. at 536. When Gomez came before the Texas Court 
of Civil Appeals, that court had held: 
[N]owhere in this elaborate statutory scheme does the State recognize any enforceable duty 
on the part of the biological father to support his illegitimate children and that, absent a 
statutory duty to support, the controlling law is the Texas common-law rule that illegitimate 
children, unlike legitimate children, have no legal right to support from their fathers. 
Id. at 536–37. 
 173. The Texas legislature created chapter 13 of the Texas Code to govern the rights of nonmarital 
children and to operate “in conjunction with other provisions of the Code to establish the duty of 
fathers to support their illegitimate children.” Mills, 456 U.S. at 94. 
 174. Id. at 95. 
 175. Id. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, observed: “Although it granted illegitimate 
children the opportunity to obtain support by establishing paternity, Texas was less than generous.” 
Id. at 94. 
 176. Id. at 101.  
 177. Id. at 105 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. at 100 (majority opinion). 
 179. Id. at 105 n.4 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Although the Court did not determine what would be an appropriate length of time for this 
type of statute of limitations, the Justices agreed that there were two criteria that needed to be taken 
into account:  
First, the period for obtaining support . . . must be sufficiently long in duration to present a 
reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their 
behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related 
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One year after Mills, the Court addressed the same question in the 
context of a two-year limitation on certain illegitimate children in 
Tennessee. In Pickett v Brown, Tennessee law held a father responsible 
for the support of his nonmarital child upon establishment of paternity, 
and the limit for filing any paternity and support action was two years.182 
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in addressing the issue, had found the 
two-year timeframe adequate to allow “for most women to have 
recovered physically and emotionally, and to be able to assess their and 
their children’s situations logically and realistically.”183 The U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, was not convinced and observed that “[p]roblems 
stemming from a mother’s emotional well-being are of particular concern 
in assessing the validity of Tennessee’s limitations period because [the 
statute] permits suit to be filed only by the mother or by her personal 
representative if the child is not likely to become a public charge.”184 The 
Texas statute in question in Mills, the Court mentioned, had allowed 
anyone connected with the child to bring suit.185 Leveraging Justice 
O’Connor’s argument from her concurrence in Mills, Brennan delivered 
the unanimous opinion for the Pickett Court and observed that most of 
the problems created by a one-year limitation continued to exist with a 
two-year limitation.186 
Neither Mills nor Pickett suggested what time limitations might be 
acceptable, leaving the door open for Clark v. Jeter in 1988.187 Relying 
heavily on the precedent of both Mills and Pickett, Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the Court, stated that even a six-year limitation ran afoul of 
the Equal Protection Clause.188 Addressing Pennsylvania’s six-year rule, 
Justice O’Connor wrote: 
 
to the State’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. 
Id. at 99–100 (majority opinion). Vectors of race and class were also present in these discussions, given 
the predominance of illegitimacy in low-income African-American families, and questions of welfare 
entitlements and alternative social norms both came into play. These questions of race and class 
emerged in procedural question that came before the Court as well. Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), and Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), both raised questions about the 
ability of low-income parents to pay for legal necessaries, such as representation of required testing. 
For more information about the intersection between race, class, and illegitimacy, see supra note 135. 
 182. 462 U.S. 1, 1–2. Exceptions existed if the father had already provided support to the child or 
had acknowledged paternity in writing, or if the child was in danger of becoming a “public charge, in 
which case the State or any person [could] bring suit at any time prior to the child’s 18th birthday.” Id. 
at 1. 
 183. Id. at 6 (quoting Pickett v. Brown, 638 S.W.2d 369, 379 (1982)). 
 184. Id. at 13. n.12. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 13–14. 
 187. 486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
 188. Id. at 463 (“In light of this authority, we conclude that Pennsylvania’s 6-year statute of 
limitations violates the Equal Protection Clause. Even six years does not necessarily provide a 
reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child.”). 
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Even six years does not necessarily provide a reasonable opportunity 
to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child. . . . Not all of these 
difficulties are likely to abate in six years. A mother might realize only 
belatedly “a loss of income attributable to the need to care for the 
child.” Furthermore, financial difficulties are likely to increase as the 
child matures and incurs expenses for clothing, school, and medical 
care.189 
Again, the Court exhibited great sensitivity to the unwed mother’s 
psychological state as she decided when and how to make a claim for 
child support. Bolstering the protection extended in these cases, the 
Court also articulated the intermediate scrutiny standard as applied to 
this class for the first time since extending equal protection to nonmarital 
children in Levy.190 Discrimination based on historical household status 
was no longer acceptable in the context of nonmarital children; 
nonmarital children had a fundamental right to equal as well as earned 
treatment, and the informal family of mother and child gained important 
validation. 
III.  Equal Parenting and the Case of the Unwed Father 
A third case that came before the Court at the same time as Reed 
and just after Levy was Stanley v. Illinois, another in this grouping of 
family-centered cases that effectuated new levels of household 
equalization and role reordering.191 Stanley used equal protection claims, 
like Reed and Levy, but this time to bring the rights of unwed fathers into 
balance with those of other parents.192 Like illegitimate children, unwed 
fathers historically were presumed to operate outside the bounds of the 
conventional household.193 The principle of filius nullius ran both ways—
the illegitimate child had no claim to parentage and the putative father 
had no rights or responsibilities with respect to a child conceived out of 
wedlock. “Unwed biological fathers had no right to commence paternity 
actions under the common law. Moreover, the common law established 
 
 189. Id. at 463–64 (citation omitted) (quoting Pickett, 462 U.S. at 12). 
 190. Id. at 461. Justice O’Connor wrote:  
Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of 
intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications 
based on sex or illegitimacy.  
  To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially 
related to an important governmental objective. Consequently we have invalidated 
classifications that burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit relations 
of their parents, because “visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and 
unjust.”  
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).  
 191. 405 U.S. 645 (1971). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 
644 (1993). 
Tait_63-HLJ-1365 (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2012 8:25 PM 
1378 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1345 
an irrebuttable presumption that a mother’s husband was the father of 
her children.”194 
If a custody dispute between unwed parents did happen to arise, the 
presumption favored the unwed mother.195 Determination of paternity 
was significantly more difficult than was establishing maternity, and the 
possibility of fraudulent claims made courts wary of decreeing paternity 
without ample evidence. The recognition of the unique relationship 
between mother and child also militated for maternal custody: 
  This common law recognition of a mother’s exclusive, primary right 
to the custody of her illegitimate child arose from the presumption that 
the mother was a better custodian than the putative father. The 
presumption was based upon . . . the strength of the bonds of love and 
affection assumed to exist between mother and child.196 
One scholar named this system of custody of and care for 
illegitimate children, in which fathers were stripped of parental identity 
and all control was given to the mother, “male coverture.”197 Male 
coverture, a mirror image of traditional coverture and a system of 
regulating the informal household, vested substantive control over and 
full economic responsibility for the nonmarital child in the mother—
making her the “head of the household” in the nonmarital family. “In 
effect, in non-marital families, men [were] ‘covered’ by women.”198 
Another family law scholar described the different rights accorded 
to and assumptions made about unwed mothers and fathers by observing 
that “since the nineteenth century, claims to maternity have invoked 
nature; claims to paternity have invoked culture.”199 Stated another way, 
claims to and discussions of parenting historically invoked nature to 
explain the affection and connection felt between a parent and child, and 
these natural analyses typically worked to the benefit of the mother and 
 
 194. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Comment, Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers’ Rights: A Psychological 
Parenthood Perspective, 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 290, 295 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
 197. Davis, supra note 114, at 73. For a chart that details the gendered role reversal that occurred 
between the formal and informal family within the system of coverture, see Kristin Collins, Note, 
When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 
109 Yale L.J. 1669, 1683 (2000). For more on the gendered assumptions underlying laws regulating 
custody and care, see Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards’ Fathers and Good Victims: 
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 Hastings L.J. 557, 
561–65 (2000). 
 198. Davis, supra note 114, at 81–82. Despite the fact that the unwed mother held all responsibility 
for her illegitimate child and the unwed father held none, the mother was still unable to legitimate the 
child on her own. “A non-married woman can never give birth to an illegitimate child in accordance 
with the legitimation principle, while a non-married man can render that birth legitimate.” Martha T. 
Zingo & Kevin E. Early, Nameless Persons: Legal Discrimination Against Non-Marital 
Children in the United States 33 (1994). In this way, while the broad contours of coverture may be 
reversed with nonmarital families, “patriarchal and paternalistic values” persist. Id. 
 199. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 646. 
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detriment of the father. Arguments from “nature,” as the illegitimacy 
cases demonstrated, supported the presence of a unique and 
irreplaceable bond between mother and child; these same arguments 
implied the lack of natural connection between a father and his child. 
Paternity invoked culture because it had no purchase in nature. As 
Ginsburg remarked, discussing Stanley, the “stereotypical notion . . . is 
evident: all women, wed or unwed, want their children and by nature are 
fit custodians; a man’s parental devotion, however, does not extend to 
the offspring of an out-of-wedlock union.”200Stanley successfully 
challenged this notion that paternity had no basis in natural feeling or 
connection; however, the string of cases involving the rights of unwed 
fathers that came after Stanley did not meet with the same success. The 
decisions in those subsequent cases both cast doubt on the parenting of 
unwed fathers and reaffirmed the idea that the failure of the unwed 
father to be attached to a family unit indicated a deeper failure as a 
parent. The blame that was lifted from the heads of illegitimate children 
came to rest on the heads of the unwed father, penalty finally finding a 
safe haven. 
A. STANLEY V. ILLINOIS: Hearing Rights and Parenting Presumptions 
The facts of Stanley, no less than those in Reed and Levy, hinted at 
the moving story of a family being torn apart by the untimely death of 
one of its members. Likewise, Stanley offered a story about individual 
family members being forced to bring legal claims in order to vindicate 
belonging to and participation in the family. In the case of Stanley, Joan 
and Peter Stanley had lived together off and on for eighteen years, 
during which time they had and raised three children.201 Peter and Joan 
had never married, and when Joan died “Peter Stanley lost not only her 
but also his children” because of an Illinois statute providing that the 
children of unwed fathers became wards of the State upon the death of 
the mother.202 Stanley claimed that he should have at least been allowed a 
hearing and that, “since married fathers and unwed mothers could not be 
deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been deprived 
of the equal protection of the laws.”203 
The State of Illinois argued that it was unnecessary to hold these 
types of individualized hearings because “unwed fathers [were] presumed 
unfit to raise their children.”204As the State declared in its brief, “in most 
 
 200. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1975). 
 201. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1971). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. Illinois did, at the time, accord hearings to any parents but defined parents as “the father 
and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, 
and . . . any adoptive parent.” Id. at 650 (citing 37 Ill. Rev. Stat. § 701-14 (1973)). 
 204. Id. at 647. 
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instances, the natural father is a stranger to his children.”205 The argument 
continued: “While a legitimate child usually is raised by both parents 
with the attendant familial relationships and a firm concept of home and 
identity, the illegitimate child normally knows only one parent—the 
mother.”206 The Supreme Court agreed in thinking that the presumption 
against unwed fathers had reasonable basis. “It may be,” the Court 
acknowledged, “that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and 
neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is such a parent and that 
his children should be placed in other hands.”207 The Court, however, was 
not ready to make a blanket assumption about the parenting capacities 
of unwed fathers, stating that “all unmarried fathers are not in this 
category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children.”208 
Avoiding judgment on whether or not Peter Stanley fell into the 
category of unsuitable and neglectful parents, the Court determined 
instead that “integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and that the right in 
question—to preserve and maintain a family—was a fundamental right.209 
Even the absence of legal marriage could not obviate the fundamental 
nature of the right. Referring to Levy, Justice White observed that 
illegitimate “children cannot be denied the right of other children 
because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and 
important as those arising within a more formally organized family 
unit.”210 If the Levy children could not be denied the right to family bonds 
because of the informal family organization, then neither could Peter 
Stanley be denied the right to be heard when the very constitution—or as 
the Court put it, the “dismemberment”211—of his family was at stake.212 
Just as important as the plurality opinion, however, may have been 
Justice Burger’s dissent, which set forth an argument that hewed closely 
to the State of Illinois’s logic and made damaging allegations about 
unwed fathers. Repeating and reifying received wisdom about unwed 
fathers, Justice Burger stated: 
 
 205. Id. at 654 n.6. 
 206. Id. at 653 n.5. According to this theory, the best interest of the child dictated that unwed 
fathers be omitted from consideration in questions of legal parentage and the statute fulfilled “the 
compelling governmental objective of protecting children.” Id. at 654 n.5. 
 207. Id. at 654. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 651. 
 210. Id. at 652. 
 211. Id. at 658. 
 212. On a practical note, the Court added that if Illinois’s contention were true and few unwed 
fathers would seek custody, then the policy of granting a hearing to these fathers would not 
overburden courts. “If unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of their children, 
they will not appear to demand hearings.” Id. at 654 n.9. 
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I believe that a State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of 
common human experience, that the biological role of the mother in 
carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds between her and 
the child than the bonds resulting from the male’s often casual 
encounter. This view is reinforced by the observable fact that most 
unwed mothers exhibit a concern for their offspring either permanently 
or at least until they are safely placed for adoption, while unwed 
fathers rarely burden either the mother or the child with their 
attentions or loyalties. Centuries of human experience buttress this 
view of the realities of human conditions and suggest that unwed 
mothers of illegitimate children are generally more dependable 
protectors of their children than are unwed fathers.213 
Breaching the boundary line set by the plurality opinion, Justice 
Burger continued his analysis by making a foray into Peter Stanley’s 
claim to be a good father. “Stanley depicts himself as a somewhat 
unusual unwed father, namely, as one who has always acknowledged and 
never doubted his fatherhood of these children. He alleges that he loved, 
cared for, and supported these children from the time of their birth until 
the death of their mother.”214 Justice Burger’s observations led him to a 
different conclusion. After the death of his wife, Justice Burger noted, 
Stanley had turned the children over to “the care of a Mr. and Mrs. 
Ness” and had taken no action to gain guardianship until the case came 
to the attention of the State through other channels.215 Even under threat 
of State action, Justice Burger suggested, Peter Stanley “seemed, in 
particular, to be concerned with the loss of the welfare payments he 
would suffer as a result of the designation of others as guardians of the 
children.”216 Peter Stanley was not, from the perspective of the dissent, a 
parent deserving of legal protection; rather than a bereaved husband and 
father, Stanley was instead a self-interested actor. 
This gender typecasting paired with the severe reading of Stanley’s 
parenting attempts provided an influential model of interpretation in the 
cases that came after Stanley. The majority’s agnosticism on the matter of 
Stanley’s parenting—coupled with Justice Burger’s dismissive analysis of 
it—preserved significant ground for skepticism about the natural 
parenting capabilities of the unwed father. Subsequently, even if Stanley 
was “the most important father’s rights decision in the United States 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,”217 the case nonetheless left the door 
open for future stereotyping of unwed fathers and gave grounds for 
 
 213. Id. at 665–66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Exceptions existed, Justice Burger allowed, but they 
were few and far between enough that the statute still served the purpose of providing for the best 
interest of the child and fulfilling “the State’s obligations as parens patriae.” Id. at 666. 
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. at 667. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Tiffany Salayer, Rights of Parents: Stanley v. Illinois, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 249, 249 
(2004). 
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judicial reluctance to fully equalize unwed fathers with other parents. 
Speaking to the Court’s failure to support the full rights of Peter Stanley, 
Ginsburg noted in an article of hers at the time, the “Court did not hold, 
as Stanley invited it to, that unwed fathers stand even with mothers and 
wed fathers when child custody is the issue.”218 
B. Preference for the “Family Unit” and One-Sided Stories 
After Stanley was decided, a string of cases in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s came before the Court with questions pertaining to adoption 
rules and procedures in the context of unwed fathers, obtaining mixed 
results. Because the Court in Stanley did not provide a blueprint for 
“how future courts would interpret the significance of the finding that 
the Stanleys were a ‘family,’”219 cases following Stanley were not pre-
determined by a strong precedent, the way that cases in the wake of Reed 
and Levy were. In most cases, diverging from Stanley’s agnostic stance 
toward the parental capability of unwed fathers, the Court denied 
putative fathers their adoption rights and determined that biology was 
insufficient grounds for paternal rights. No discussion of historical 
discrimination or unconstitutional gender typecasting was present in 
these adoption cases. The Court focused instead on natural family 
connections—connections between parents and children as well as 
between the mothers and fathers themselves—using a framework that 
prioritized the nuclear, whether formal or informal. In addition to 
reasoning based on natural connections, the idea of earned treatment 
was present in these cases. However, it worked against unwed fathers 
who generally were construed by the Court to have failed to earn the 
right to participate in the family as a parent. In this sense, the Court took 
a page from Justice Burger’s dissent rather than the Stanley plurality 
opinion by passing judgment on the quality of the family interaction and 
not the structural inequities of adoption statutes. 
1.  Putative Fathers and the Importance of Being Married 
The first adoption rights case to come before the Court after Stanley 
was Quilloin v. Walcott in 1978.220 Quilloin involved the constitutionality 
of Georgia’s adoption law denying an unwed father “authority to prevent 
the adoption of his illegitimate child.”221 Five years after Quilloin, the 
 
 218. Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 459. 
 219. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 651 (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651). 
 220. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). Leon Webster Quilloin and Ardell Williams had a child out of wedlock in 
1964 and separated not long after. Id. at 247. Three years later, Williams married Randall Walcott, and 
nine years after that, she consented to the adoption of the child by her husband. Id. Quilloin attempted 
to block the adoption and to secure visitation rights, but the court granted Walcott’s adoption of the 
child over Quilloin’s objection. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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case of Lehr v. Robertson brought up questions surrounding notice of 
adoption to unwed fathers and the utility of the putative father registry.222 
Both cases involved a putative father whose right to prevent the 
adoption of his illegitimate child by the mother’s new husband was in 
question. The Court immediately distinguished Quilloin (and indirectly 
Lehr) from Stanley, observing that “Stanley left unresolved the degree of 
protection a State must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a 
situation, such as that presented here, in which the countervailing 
interests are more substantial.”223 In both Quilloin and Lehr, the 
countervailing interest was represented by the mother’s new husband 
and the child’s would-be father, who represented the promise of a new 
nuclear family in which the child would presumably thrive. This prospect 
of a functional family unit outweighed the claim of biology, effectively 
marginalizing and displacing the unwed father who remained unattached 
and unaccounted for in any nuclear family. In other words:  
Faced with the prospect of recognizing the rights of an itinerant 
unmarried father—that is, a father who failed to comport with the 
paternal norms developed in the context of the marital family—the 
Court chose to sever paternal rights, allowing the child to be adopted 
into a marital family.224 
Beginning the Lehr opinion with a poetic nod to the changing 
circumstances and iterations of family life, Justice Stevens wrote: “The 
intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They 
are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with 
strength, beauty, and flexibility.”225 He changed course, however, and 
finished the thought by stating, “In deciding whether this is such a 
case . . . we must consider the broad framework that has traditionally 
been used to resolve the legal problems arising from the parent-child 
relationship.”226 This broad legal framework meant a preference for the 
formal family—or, at the margin, family arrangements that resembled 
the formal family. Justice Stevens elaborated: “The institution of 
marriage has played a critical role both in defining the legal entitlements 
of family members and in developing the decentralized structure of our 
 
 222. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). At issue was a question of what types of fathers had the right to notice of 
adoption. Id. at 249–50. The relevant New York statute required that notice be given to unwed fathers 
whose paternity had been adjudicated, who were identified as the father on the child’s birth certificate, 
who lived openly with the child and the child’s mother and thereby held themselves out to be the 
father, who had been identified as the father by the mother in a sworn written statement, and who 
were married to the child’s mother before the child was six months old. Id. at 251. Outside these 
categories, the State also provided notice to the unwed father if he had registered with the putative 
father registry. Id. at 250–51. Jonathan Lehr did not fit into any of the statutory categories and had 
failed to enter his name into the putative father registry. Id. at 251–52. 
 223. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248. 
 224. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 27, at 1254. 
 225. 463 U.S. at 256. 
 226. Id.  
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democratic society. In recognition of that role . . . state laws almost 
universally express an appropriate preference for the formal family.”227 
Operating within this logic in Quilloin, the Court was sympathetic to 
the interests of the new husband and would-be father, because he—not 
Leon Quilloin—represented the male in the “family unit.”228 Restating 
and agreeing with the prior holding of the Georgia Supreme Court, 
Justice Marshall wrote: 
The majority relied generally on the strong state policy of rearing 
children in a family setting, a policy which in the court’s view might be 
thwarted if unwed fathers were required to consent to adoptions. The 
court also emphasized . . . that the adoption was sought by the child’s 
step-father, who was part of the family unit in which the child was in 
fact living, and . . . . unlike the father in Stanley, appellant had never 
been a de facto member of the child’s family unit.229 
Supporting this logic, and invoking the best interest of the child, the 
Court reiterated that denial of adoption rights to Quilloin was not unfair 
because he had never “sought[] actual or legal custody of his child”230 and 
because “the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition 
to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, 
except appellant.”231 The result desired by the unwed father had little 
importance because he had exempted himself from the right to protest 
by being an absent family member who did not participate in the family 
unit. 
Caban v. Mohammed—one of the few cases that came out in favor 
of the unwed father—confirmed this theory of the importance of the 
formal or nuclear family.232 A year after Quilloin, Caban came before the 
Court with a story about an unwed father who surmounted stereotype 
not only by living with the mother of his children as if married but also by 
marrying another woman after the mother of his children left him, 
thereby proving his stability as a partner as well as a parent.233 Abdiel 
Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together from 1968 through 1973, 
and “represented themselves as being husband and wife, although they 
never legally married.”234 During that time, the couple had two children 
and Caban was listed on the birth certificates as the father.235 In 1973, 
Mohammed left Caban and took the children.236 She married Kazin 
 
 227. Id. at 256–57. 
 228. 434 U.S. at 253. 
 229. Id. at 252–53. 
 230. Id. at 255. 
 231. Id.  
 232. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 233.  Id. at 382–83. 
 234. Id. at 382. 
 235. Id. 
 236.  Id. 
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Mohammed and, not long after, Caban married as well.237 Several years 
later, when Mohammed’s husband petitioned to adopt the two children, 
Caban and his new wife submitted a cross-petition.238 
In deciding Caban’s rights with respect to his children, the Court 
focused heavily on the presence of a “natural family”239 during the time 
that the children were growing up. Caban had been a part of the nuclear 
family and a daily presence in the household. In fact, the Court stated: 
“There is no reason to believe that the Caban children . . . had a 
relationship with their mother unrivaled by the affection and concern of 
their father.”240 Caban had stayed with Mohammed and the children until 
she left him and subsequently married—another instance in which their 
story broke with stereotype in that the mother was the one to leave the 
relationship.241 Furthermore, Caban married after Mohammed left him, 
attaching himself to a new nuclear family.242 Consequently, Caban did not 
demonstrate the same lack of partnering and parenting skills that the 
other unwed fathers were perceived to exhibit. “Mediating between a 
father and his rights to his biological children [was] the institution of 
marriage.”243 Caban’s willingness to partner in marriage and marriage-
like relationships was ultimately what made him a good parent, as these 
qualities contributed to providing the children with “the stability of a 
normal, two-parent home.”244 In Quilloin and Lehr, the mediation of 
marriage condemned the unwed father to exclusion and judgment. In 
Caban, however, this mediation worked in favor of the “unwed” father 
who happened to be a married man.245 In each circumstance, the Court 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 383. New York’s domestic relations law at the time provided that consent to adoption 
was required by either parent of a child born in wedlock, but for a child born out of wedlock, only the 
consent of the mother was necessary. Id. at 386–86 (citing N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111 (McKinney 
1977)). 
 239. Id. at 389. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 382. 
 242. Id. at 383. 
 243. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 645. Fineman suggests that this focus on the marital relationship 
happens with mothers as well: “The wider academic and policy communities share with feminists a 
seeming inability to look at the mother-child relationship (or other versions of the caretaker-
dependent relationship) without reflexively refocusing the discussion back to the dynamics of marriage 
and the interactive responsibility of the marital couple.” Fineman, supra note 25, at 12. 
 244. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391. 
 245. Even though the Court found Caban to be a deserving father, the Court did not disallow the 
possibility that generally “unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn 
infants.” Id. at 389. The opinion did mention that “this generalization concerning parent-child 
relations would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child 
increased.” Id.  
Caroline Rogus has said, referring to Caban: “Even when striking down impermissible gender-
based generalizations in statutes, the Court reinforced the stereotype that women are natural 
caretakers and therefore assume the role of mother when they give birth.” Caroline Rogus, Comment, 
Conflating Women’s Biological and Sociological Roles: The Ideal of Motherhood, Equal Protection, 
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confirmed the notion that a “man becomes a father by relating to his 
child in the context of family.”246 
2. Child Support and the “Daily Supervision of the Child” 
When unwed fathers were not able to gain parenting rights or even 
to block the adoption of their children, they were hindered not only by 
their failure to function as part of a family unit but also by a perceived 
failure to invest in the family and to thereby earn family rights and 
belonging. In both Quilloin and Lehr, the Court chose to focus on what 
the unwed fathers failed to contribute, rather than what they actually 
invested in the family. Unlike in the statutes of limitation cases, where 
the Court demonstrated concern for the unwed mother and tried to 
understand the possible impact of being an unwed parent on an 
individual’s emotional and psychological state, here the Court displayed 
no such inclination or sympathy. Certainly in the case of Lehr, the 
majority spun a one-sided story that ignored the unwed father’s attempts 
to contribute to the care of the child. The Court selectively took into 
account the idea of earned family, and the evaluation of a father’s earned 
treatment was indexed to the related evaluation of a father’s 
participation in a nuclear family. When the father failed as a member of 
the natural, nuclear family, then he also failed to earn belonging. The 
natural connections theory, therefore, illustrated the limitations of 
earned belonging. 
 
and the Implications of the Nguyen v. INS Opinion, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 803, 811 (2003).  
This perspective on the existence and development of a unique mother-child affective bond was 
amplified in a dissent penned by Justice Stevens. Caban, 441 U.S. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Drawing on sociological and anthropological research, Justice Stevens indicated that “by virtue of the 
symbiotic relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and the initial contact between 
mother and child directly after birth a physical and psychological bond immediately develops between 
the two that is not then present between the infant and the father or any other person.” Id. at 405 n.10. 
Justice Stevens admitted circumstances in which the father might be given a voice in adoption decisions, 
but he remained adamant that “as a matter of equal protection analysis, it is perfectly obvious that at the 
time and immediately after a child is born out of wedlock, differences between men and women justify 
some differential treatment of the mother and father in the adoption process.” Id. at 406–07.  
In a separate dissent, Justice Stewart concurred with Justice Stevens, saying “unwed mothers and 
unwed fathers are simply not similarly situated” and repeating the truism that “the vast majority of 
unwed fathers have been unknown, unavailable, or simply uninterested.” Id. at 398–99 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). Rogus states that:  
The Court has invariably conflated the ideal of motherhood with the idea of birth. Such 
confusion of sociology and biology, while at times appearing to benefit women via better 
treatment under custody or citizenship statutes, in the end succeeds only in perpetuating 
“fixed notions” of “the roles and abilities” of women. 
Rogus, supra at 814 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996)). 
 246. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 672; see Linda Kelly, The Alienation of Fathers, 6 Mich. J. Race & 
L. 181, 188 (2000). Kelly discusses the Supreme Court’s assumption in these cases that the “unwed 
biological father could not have a valuable relationship with his child” and that any parental 
obligations would always be “assumed by the married woman’s husband.” Id.  
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In Quilloin, Leon Quilloin argued that he had rights stemming from 
the fact that he paid his child support and that his interests were 
“indistinguishable from those of a married father who is separated or 
divorced from the mother and is no longer living with his child.”247 The 
Court, however, quickly determined that the two types of interests were 
“readily distinguishable.”248 
  Although appellant was subject . . . to essentially the same child-
support obligation as a married father would have had, . . . he has 
never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has 
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily 
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.249 
Making the implicit assertion that all married fathers performed 
these significant responsibilities tied to caretaking and child rearing, the 
Court dismissed the possibility of family arrangements that operated 
outside of the nuclear family. In addition, the Court discounted the 
notion of earned rights to family based solely on economic support. The 
Court glossed over the fact that Quilloin had provided economic support 
for his child—noting that it was provided “only on an irregular basis”250—
and that Quilloin had visited the child on “many occasions,”251 bringing 
“toys and gifts.”252 Rather, the Court relied on the mother’s judgment 
“that these contacts were having a disruptive effect on the child and on 
appellees’ entire family.”253 
Similarly, in Lehr, although the father had lived with the mother of 
the child before the child’s birth and had visited her in the hospital when 
she gave birth, the Court focused on the fact that the couple never lived 
together after the child’s birth.254 The opinion mentioned that “he [had] 
never provided them with any financial support, and he [had] never 
offered to marry appellee.”255 Citing to Quilloin and the requirement that 
a parent shoulder “significant responsibility with respect to the daily 
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child,”256 the Court 
reiterated the idea that there was an equation between the work invested 
into parenting and the rights available to the parent. Part of that work 
 
 247. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 251. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 251–52 (1983). 
 255. Id. at 252. The suggestion that the father ought to have offered himself in marriage to the 
mother implicitly reflected the historical idea that a man could remedy a crime of seduction through 
an offer of marriage. See Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2012) 
(“Seduction statutes routinely prescribed a bar to prosecution for the offense: marriage. The 
defendant could simply marry the victim and avoid liability for the crime.”). 
 256. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256. 
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was being a daily presence in the child’s life and being based in the same 
household. Part of that work was, as the majority suggested, making an 
offer of marriage to the child’s mother. 
Rejecting this narrative as biased, Justices White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion, proclaiming that the plurality in 
Lehr chose to overlook that “from the time Lorraine was discharged 
from the hospital until August 1978, she concealed her whereabouts from 
him.”257 The dissenting opinion told a different story about the unwed 
father, painting a picture of a man who “never ceased his efforts to locate 
Lorraine and Jessica and . . . . when he did determine Lorraine’s location, 
he visited with her and her children to the extent she was willing to 
permit it.”258 Lehr had “offered to provide financial assistance and to set 
up a trust fund for Jessica,” but the mother had refused this offer.259 Not 
only was there an alternate view of family, the dissent suggested, but also 
an entirely different set of facts available. Ignoring this suggestion, 
however, the plurality found that Lehr had not sufficiently participated 
in the family unit and denied his due process claim, just as the Court had 
dismissed Quilloin’s claims five years earlier.260 The collective lesson was 
that investment—economic and other—in the family, while necessary, 
was not sufficient to earn unwed fathers a place at the family table unless 
paired with the belonging in and subscription to the idea of the nuclear 
and natural family as constructed by the Court.261 
 
 257. 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting). 
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 267–68 (majority opinion).  
 261. The Court continued to reiterate the ideas that unwed fathers were lesser parents, that 
mothers had a biological advantage in parenting, and that sex-based categories in the context of unwed 
fathers were acceptable. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); 
Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam). Justice Ginsburg dissented in both 
Miller and Nguyen, and Flores-Villar was a 4–4 per curiam decision with Justice Kagan not 
participating. Dissenting in Miller, Justice Ginsburg used the historic household theory to argue her 
point. 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She observed that the legislature was “shaping 
government policy to fit and reinforce the stereotype or historic pattern.” Id. She proceeded to document 
the historical legal treatment of children born abroad to U.S. citizen parents, beginning in 1790, 
showcasing the way in which assumptions concerning unwed mothers and fathers were not inevitable 
conclusions but rather cultural constructs indexed to particular historical moments. See id. at 460–68.  
Justice Stevens, using the natural connections theory in writing the opinion, stated that the 
gender categories did not represent outdated forms of stereotyping but rather the “undisputed 
assumption that fathers are less likely than mothers to have the opportunity to develop relationships.” 
Id. at 444 (plurality opinion). This differential was tied to the process and act of childbirth: “[D]ue to 
the normal interval of nine months between conception and birth, the unmarried father may not even 
know that his child exists, and the child may not know the father’s identity.” Id. at 438. For a 
discussion of Ginsburg’s focus on history and use of the historical argument, see Collins, supra note 
197, at 1669. “Justice Ginsburg used the history of American citizenship law as evidence that gender 
stereotypes have functioned in citizenship transmission since the Founding, and to intimate that § 1409 
is a modern, father-disadvantaging incarnation of ongoing discriminatory practices.” Id. at 1680; see M. 
Isabel Medina, Real Differences and Stereotypes—Two Visions of Gender, Citizenship and 
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Conclusion 
Three lines of logic—history, nature, and earning—provided distinct 
modes of analysis with which to build advocacy arguments and ground 
judicial reasoning. Historical argument, as developed by Ginsburg, 
succeeded best when showcasing points of disjuncture between the 
historical and the modern, signaling the outdated nature of the 
regulation in question. The historical household theory was bolstered by 
a broad and widely accepted meta-narrative about the evolution of the 
family from patriarchal hierarchy—in which the “obligations and rights 
accorded people within families stemmed from the inexorable nature of 
the ties that linked the members of a family together”262—to equalized 
unit.263 Arguments from history flagged this evolution in household 
practice for the Supreme Court and called for the law to be responsive to 
social change, lest regulation be predicated on faulty or inapt assumptions.  
The theory of natural connections, on the other hand, offered a very 
different way of considering the family and its composition. The natural 
connections argument was based on the idea that the nuclear family 
possessed an inherently optimal structure and that the work of 
legislatures and courts was to support this form whenever possible. 
Replacing the nuclear family was not an option; the nuclear family was, if 
anything, “merely in need of adjustment or minor modification.”264 
According to this logic, biology was indeed destiny and the ability to 
parent was not created by social conditions but rather by innate talent 
indexed to gender. Consequently, when the Court relied upon 
anthropological ideas about the nature of the family to provide an 
understanding of how the spouses and parents fit into the family unit, 
arguments about historical stereotyping and marginalization held little 
sway. 
 
International Law, 7 N.Y. City L. Rev. 315, 317 (2004). 
 262. Dolgin, supra note 193, at 638. In the historical view of the family, expressed in the doctrine of 
domestic relations and the master-servant relationship, “obligations and rights accorded people within 
families stemmed from the inexorable nature of the ties that linked the members of a family together.” 
Id. Conventional histories hold that these structures were softened or displaced by the end of the 
nineteenth century. “But as one begins to scrutinize particular bodies of nineteenth-century law, it 
becomes clear that such changes did not eradicate foundational status structures: In gender, race, and 
class relationships, the legal system continued to allocate privileges and entitlements in a manner that 
perpetuated former systems of express hierarchy.” Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer 
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1116 (1997). 
 263. Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:” Toward a History of Family 
Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819, 833. Depicted as a story of progress, the traditional outline of family law 
treated the disabilities legally imposed on wives (and children) as outmoded restrictions giving way 
over time, allowing for increased affirmative rights for women both within the family and in relation to 
the commercial and public worlds. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 
67 Tul. L. Rev. 955, 972–75 (1993) (“The movement toward individual rights in the family during this 
century may be seen as part of a more general liberal progression . . . .”). 
 264. Fineman, supra note 23, at 404. 
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The third way, earned belonging, represented a step forward in time 
and outlook and embodied a particularly American desire to reward 
merit rather than birth. Earned belonging was democratic and embodied 
the idiom of “just deserts.” Creating blinders where gender and other 
markers of difference were concerned, earned belonging allowed courts 
to evaluate performance rather than status and made it easier for 
historically disadvantaged classes to gain access to rights and resources. 
For this reason, the concept of earned belonging complemented 
historical analysis by providing a new logic to replace that of historical 
hierarchy. The cases concerning wives and illegitimate children 
illustrated the virtues as well as the success of the earnings logic. When 
Ginsburg and her colleagues pushed the Court to reject the historical 
household, they offered the earnings idea as a less hierarchical and more 
democratic mode—and, in the majority of cases, the Court supported the 
proposed substitution.  
The Court’s application of the natural connections theory, however, 
demonstrated the limits of the earned belonging theory. In the adoption 
cases following Stanley, biology and not individual contribution 
predetermined the capacity of the unwed father to parent. In these cases, 
the Court brushed aside extenuating circumstances—as well as facts 
supporting the parenting efforts and ability of the unwed father—and 
invoked “human experience” and “sociological and anthropological 
research” to support the constitutionality of letting particular sex-based 
differences stand. Instead of rewarding unwed fathers for providing 
financial support or visiting their children, the Court penalized them for 
being irresponsible and failing to marry the mothers of their illegitimate 
children.265 The Court, unwilling to question the supposed biology of 
parenting, was unable to assign value to contributions that came in 
unconventional forms and from “‘deviant’ family units.”266 In this way, 
the plight of unwed fathers brought into sharp focus the failing of earned 
belonging theory by demonstrating how a court’s calculation of earnings 
could be biased and how certain contributions could easily be discounted 
when the natural connections theory cast its long shadow.  
Nonetheless, the theory of earned belonging cleared a broad 
expanse of space for gender-neutral arguments and judgments about 
family inclusion to flourish by creating a “neutral, functional description”267 
 
 265. As one New Jersey court summarized: “Filiation statutes are generally considered to 
represent an exercise of the police power for the primary purposes of denouncing the misconduct 
involved, punishing the offender or shifting the burden of support from society to the child’s natural 
parent.” State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); see Katherine Baker, Bargaining 
or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 1, 7 (2004). 
 266. Zingo & Early, supra note 198, at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 267. Id. 
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for families. When making determinations about individual rights 
according to the earned belonging theory, courts could no longer rely on 
stereotypes to determine a wife’s proper entitlements, the rights of an 
illegitimate child to claim family benefits, or—in theory—the fitness of 
an unwed father as a parent. Earned belonging offered a democratic 
vision of the family, pairing equal rights with equal contribution, and 
pointed a way past the lattice of barriers that both history and nature had 
built. 
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